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INTRODUCTION
The great hope of administrative law in the New Deal was that
expertise and professionalism, balanced by political accountability
and careful institutional design, would yield the best possible
governance in a decidedly imperfect world. Administrative agencies
were to step in where both the judiciary and the legislature had failed,
avoiding the dangers of government by plutocracy and government
1
by
patronage.
Agencies
would
discharge
government’s
“responsibility not merely to maintain ethical levels in the economic
relations of the members of society, but to provide for the efficient
2
functioning of the economic processes of the state.” To do so, they
would study social and economic problems thoroughly and regulate
wisely relying on scientific or empirical information that courts and
3
legislatures did not consider. Moreover, they would provide a forum

1. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15–16 (1938).
2. Id. at 16.
3. See id. at 37–39.
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in which the stakeholders in a regulated industry could participate in
4
resolving disputes. Sensible policy would emerge through careful and
inclusive procedure, reliance on experts and empirical evidence, and
5
political accountability for value choices. Agencies would be
responsive to changing circumstances and innovate when necessary,
but they would do so with a healthy respect for the rule of law and the
6
value of process.
One can find in the early discussion of administrative law
particularly high hopes for the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). James Landis, in his classic 1938 lectures on the
administrative state, said the NLRB had as its “jurisdiction the
general problem of unfair practices” regarding labor and had as its
responsibility the “policing of industry as a whole,” not merely, as in
the case of other agencies, the “supervision over the welfare of a
7
definable line of business.”
Unfortunately, the NLRB is not well suited to the regulatory
task of bringing public-minded rationality to the processes of labor
organizing and collective bargaining. From the agency’s beginning,
the Supreme Court has sharply limited the Board’s range of policy
discretion in the name of judicial supremacy in the interpretation of
8
statutes. Within its range of discretionary policymaking, the Board
has oscillated between extremes with every change of controlling
political party, bringing its legitimacy as expert policymaker sharply
9
into question. Part of the reason for the essentially political nature of
Board decisionmaking is that the agency lacks the kind of non-legal
expertise that the administrative state was supposed to bring to the
10
table. Although the Board has disappointed people across the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 38–40.
See id. at 40–46.
See id. at 150–55.
Id. at 16–17.
For important early examples, see JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN
LABOR LAW (1983).
9. One particularly egregious example was Board policy on the regulation of
misrepresentations made during election campaigns. For a discussion, see, for example, Samuel
Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV.
163, 163–75 (1985).
10. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2006) (added by the TaftHartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–87 (2006))
(“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the
purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis.”)). For the disputes leading up
to this provision, see JAMES GROSS, THE REMAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION 1937–1947, at 5–225 (1981).
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political spectrum who believed in the promise of the administrative
state, the failures of the NLRB have been a particularly bitter
disappointment to those on the left because they had the highest
11
hopes for administrative regulation.
For decades, academic and judicial critics of the Board have
urged it to embrace rulemaking, especially for cases in which it
12
contemplates overruling precedent. The courts lack power to force
13
rulemaking on the NLRB, but their impatience with the Board
14
manifests itself in many other ways—and does so often.
11. For two excellent and broad-ranging recent critiques, see James J. Brudney, Isolated
and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 241–52 (2005);
Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1535–44
(2002).
12. See, e.g., Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 610–22 (1970); Brudney, supra note 11, at
234–37; Estreicher, supra note 9, at 175–77; Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 752–62 (1960); Cornelius J.
Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board’s Performance in Policy Formulation:
Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 260–75 (1968); Clyde W. Summers,
Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 105–07 (1954); Ronald Turner,
Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 752–
61 (2006); George W. Chesrow, Comment, NLRB Policymaking: The Rulemaking-Adjudication
Dilemma Revisited in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 570–82 (1975). A
classic discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of rulemaking and adjudication as
policymaking vehicles, including but not limited to discussion of the NLRB, is David L. Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78
HARV. L. REV. 921 passim (1965). Indeed, The President’s Committee on Administrative
Management recommended to President Roosevelt and Congress in 1937—just two years after
the passage of the Wagner Act—that in general
Congress should consider whether it is not desirable for the rule-making power
further to penetrate into those areas of policy determination now preempted by
commissions that develop such policies as a mere byproduct of administrative
adjudication. . . . It is one thing to allow sufficient discretion in individual cases to
make possible the adaptation of general rules to the peculiar facts of each case. It is
quite another to have no general rules, other than empty statutory formulas, to guide
particular adjudications.
THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 316, 332 (1937).
13. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294–95 (1974); NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765–66 (1969); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
229–31 (2001) (including both notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication as
“relatively formal administrative procedure[s] tending to foster the fairness and deliberation
that should underlie a pronouncement” with force of law); cf. SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 94–
95 (1943) (suggesting that the courts’ review of administrative decisions is limited to whether
“the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its
action can be sustained”).
14. One example of the longstanding judicial frustration may be found in the many
decisions rejecting the Board’s interpretation of section 2(11), which excludes supervisors from
the definition of employees entitled to the protection of the NLRA. The history of the
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The fact that the NLRB eschews notice-and-comment
rulemaking makes it immune to the frequent post–Administrative
Procedure Act waves of regulatory reform that have focused on the
15
rationalization and coordination of informal rulemaking. The NLRB
has the power to engage in rulemaking, and has even done so (exactly
16
once) with considerable success, if success can be measured by the
17
Supreme Court’s satisfaction with the process. But the agency
immediately returned to its old ways: it occasionally proposes
rulemaking but withdraws its proposals without explanation (and
18
seemingly without regret). Thus, the debate (made especially
important by the appointment of Professor Cass Sunstein to head the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)) over whether
supervisory exclusion, with particular focus on the ongoing controversy about which health care
employees are supervisors, is covered in Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of
Professional and Supervisory Status: Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle?, in LABOR LAW
STORIES 353–98 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
15. See, e.g., Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2006); Administrative
Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2006). This is not to say that Congress and the Executive could
not come up with regulatory reform strategies for agency adjudication, but they have not done
so.
16. Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (Apr.
21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2008)).
17. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613–20 (1991); Mark H. Grunewald, The
NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 passim (1991)
(describing the NLRB’s rulemaking process and subsequent litigation regarding the rule). See
generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB—A
MEMOIR 69–74 (2000) (“The Board’s rule making, which was approved by the Supreme Court
in American Hospital Association v. NLRB, had substantially diminished litigation in this
industry.”). The Administrative Conference of the United States issued recommendations
regarding, inter alia, “Facilitating the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor Relations
Board” in the aftermath of that rulemaking. 56 Fed. Reg. 33,841, 33,851–52 (July 24, 1991)
(codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-5 (2006) (“This recommendation, while recognizing that the
Board will justifiably continue to make policy through adjudication, suggests steps to facilitate
further rulemaking by the Board . . . .”).
18. See, e.g., Unified Agenda, National Labor Relations Board, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,036, 23,036
(Apr. 27, 1998) (withdrawing notice of proposed rulemaking on some questions of remedies
“frequently appearing in Board decisions”); Unified Agenda, National Labor Relations Board,
61 Fed. Reg. 24,045, 24,045 (May 13, 1996) (withdrawing notice of proposed rulemaking on the
duties of labor organizations under Beck, choosing instead “to address the issues raised
following the Beck decision on a case-by-case basis through its adjudicatory procedures”). To be
fair, on some occasions Congress blocks the NLRB from pursuing rulemaking. See, e.g., Unified
Agenda, National Labor Relations Board, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,528, 63,528–29 (Nov. 29, 1996)
(explaining a lack of action in a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the appropriateness of
requested single-location bargaining units in representation cases because “a rider attached to
the 1996 and 1997 appropriations bills prohibits the Agency from expending any funds to
promulgate a final rule”). After a 1998 rider to the same effect, the Board indefinitely withdrew
the notice of proposed rulemaking over the dissent of Chairman Gould. Unified Agenda,
National Labor Relations Board, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,036, 23,036–37 (Apr. 27, 1998).
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independent agencies are subject to executive branch coordination
and oversight will have little impact on the NLRB because the agency
19
relies only on adjudication.
Much of what the Board does by adjudication amounts to
policymaking. In this Article we evaluate NLRB policymaking by
adjudication on its own terms, and in the process bring the NLRB
into the general conversation about developments in administrative
law.
From the standpoint of labor law specialists, a shift in perspective
from substantive labor law to administrative law might prove helpful.
As is well known and much lamented in the labor law field, the last
20
round of congressional labor law reform took place in the late 1950s,
and, at least given presidential priorities in the current economic
crisis, the chances for passage of the pending Employee Free Choice
21
Act are uncertain despite Democratic Party control of Congress and
the White House. Solutions to the NLRB’s problems are less likely to
come from labor law reform in Congress than from closer attention to
the demands of administrative law by all charged with review and
oversight of the Board, and by the Board itself.
22
The Bush II Board made a number of significant and
controversial policy changes, both in substantive law and in its
enforcement process, and the issue we seek to address in this Article
is how to evaluate those changes as a matter of administrative law (as
opposed to as a matter of labor policy preference). Even within the
limits of adjudication, there are ways that the NLRB—with the urging
of the courts of appeal—can increase the coherence and legitimacy
(legal and political) of its policymaking.
In Part I, we provide an overview of the decisions of the Bush II
Board that have provoked the greatest controversy, both within and
outside the Board.

19. For the proposal, see Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for
Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1489, 1494–97 (2002). For early proposals on the exercise of executive control over rulemaking
(but not adjudication) by independent agencies, see THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN.
MGMT., supra note 12, at 333.
20. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 228; Estlund, supra note 11, at 1530.
21. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); Employee Free
Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
22. We use Bush II Board to refer to the Board during the eight-year administration of
President George W. Bush. Bush I Board refers to the Board during the administration of
President George H.W. Bush.
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In Part II, we demonstrate that the unresolved tensions between
two major components of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)—the 1935 Wagner Act and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act—are
centrally implicated in the Bush II Board controversies. These are, we
argue, the kinds of conundrums that cannot be resolved without
recourse to precisely the administrative law tools the agency lacks. In
the course of so doing, we raise the question of where the line should
be drawn between Board findings of law and Board discretionary
policymaking, a distinction with great significance to the relationship
between the Board and the courts.
In Part III, we look to the historical antecedents of NLRB
policymaking by adjudication. We also describe some of the structural
obstacles the NLRB faces in attempting to make coherent policy.
These include the exclusion of social scientists from its policymaking
staff and social science–based reasoning from its decisions, its
isolation from labor policymaking activities and data analysis at the
Department of Labor, and the tendency of Board members, who
recently have been drawn almost entirely from the ranks of labor and
management attorneys, to reason like lawyers balancing rights rather
than policy analysts studying social and economic regulatory
problems.
In Part IV, using examples from the Bush II and Clinton Boards,
we show that the result has been a formalistic style of adjudicatory
reasoning that packages questions of policy as questions of law, and,
in so doing, deems social science data and analysis (what might be
characterized as “legislative facts”) irrelevant to Board policymaking.
We end, in Part V, with some modest recommendations for how
the executive, Congress (through the oversight and appropriations
processes), the Obama Board (with Bush II Board dissenter Wilma
Liebman as its designated chair), process-oriented courts of appeals,
and the Supreme Court might improve the quality of Board
decisionmaking—rather than just putting their mark on its political
leanings. In particular, we suggest: (1) that the NLRB should be
encouraged to take a more holistic regulatory approach to problem
solving, including by increasing its reliance on social science expertise
and Department of Labor data in both adjudication and rulemaking;
(2) that the executive consider across-the-board reform of
independent agencies and those agencies that rely primarily on
adjudication; (3) that Congress consider enhancing its own policy
analysis in the labor field; and (4) that both courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court assimilate review of NLRB action into the way they
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review the action of all federal agencies to be more coherent and
consistent in how they draw the line between law, fact, and policy and
the extent to which they will defer to agency adjudicatory decisions.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BUSH II BOARD
Those familiar with the Board know that it changes the rules
depending on which party occupies the White House. Eight years
allows a Board to remake the law fairly significantly, as the Board
issues hundreds of decisions each year. The changes from one
administration to another were less sweeping during the first four
decades of the Board’s existence because there was some consensus
23
that Board appointments should be relatively middle-of-the-road.
As Professor Joan Flynn has shown, Republicans first broke with that
tradition during the Eisenhower administration and many years
24
later—in the Clinton administration—Democrats did too. The Bush
II Board’s swing to the right was not a difference in kind as compared
to the twelve years of Reagan-Bush Boards, but its effects were
magnified by significant changes in the economy that raised the
question of whether the NLRA has a meaningful future in regulating
the American workforce. Doctrinally, some of the changes simply
overruled decisions from the Clinton Board which themselves had
overruled decisions from the Reagan or Bush I Boards. Some of the
decisions addressed issues that are new because of the changing
economy. Some overturned longstanding precedent. And some did
not appear to overturn precedent but simply limited prior contrary
decisions to their facts.
Across a range of doctrinal arenas, it is apparent that Bush II
labor policy made a decisive shift in favor of protecting managerial
prerogative and augmenting the ability of employers and employees
to oppose unionization. We discuss several of the most significant
Bush II Board policy changes, including those limiting the availability
of voluntary recognition of unions, those relating to the scope of the
section 7 protections for concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, and the use of interim injunctions against ongoing unfair
labor practices under section 10(j).

23. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1367–68 (2000).
24. Id. at 1369, 1392.
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A. Constraining the Availability of Voluntary Recognition
One of the most controversial decisions of the Bush II Board was
25
Dana Corporation, which addressed the availability of card check as
26
a vehicle for union recognition. This figures to be a huge issue going
forward, as unions have increasingly begun seeking recognition based
on a showing of signed union authorization cards combined with
economic and political pressure rather than an election supervised by
27
the NLRB. Indeed, labor’s top legislative priority is the Employee
Free Choice Act, which would require employers to recognize a
union based on a showing of union authorization cards signed by
employees rather than based on a ballot election conducted after the
28
customary anti-union campaign. In the Dana case, the Bush II Board
limited the effectiveness of the card-check recognition strategy by
making bargaining relationships formed through card-check
recognition more easily eliminated than a bargaining relationship
29
formed through an NLRB-supervised election. In Dana, a majority
of the Board overturned the old rule, which treated challenges to
unions that were voluntarily recognized in the same manner as
30
challenges to unions selected through NLRB-sponsored elections.
Dana adopted a new rule allowing a decertification petition at any
time after voluntary recognition, including after an employer and
union had signed a collective bargaining agreement, unless the
employer or union followed newly imposed procedural requirements
31
after voluntary recognition.

25. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
26. Id. at 434–35.
27. See generally James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824–40 (2005) (detailing the
proliferation of card-check agreements beginning in the 1970s and accelerating in the 1990s);
Benjamin Sachs, Card Check and Employee Choice: A New Altering Rule for Labor Law’s
Asymmetric Default, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2010) (manuscript at 13–21, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (analyzing contemporary use of authorization cards and proposing
reforms to maximize employee free choice and informed decisionmaking and to minimize
potential for union or employer coercion during the union organizing process).
28. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Employee Free
Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
29. Dana, 351 N.L.R.B. at 441–44.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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B. Narrowing the Scope of Concerted Activity for Mutual Aid and
Protection
Section 7 of the NLRA protects the right to “form, join, or
assist” a labor organization, the right to “engage in other concerted
activities for mutual aid and protection,” and the right to refrain from
32
doing so. In a number of areas, the Bush II Board limited the scope
of the section 7 protections. Several of the most noteworthy cases are
discussed here.
1. Section 7 Protection for Union Activity. First, in a series of
decisions arising out of union organizing efforts, the Board limited
section 7 protection for assisting labor organizations. Some of the
decisions pared back standard protections. For example, in Aladdin
33
Gaming, a divided Board held that supervisors monitoring employee
break-room conversations about union organizing was not unlawful
34
surveillance. The majority characterized the supervisor’s conduct of
hovering around and interjecting in employee conversations as a
combination of normal social interaction and exercise of the
35
employer’s free speech rights. The dissent perceived the conduct to
be coercive surveillance designed to deter employees from engaging
in section 7 conduct and would have found it illegal under
36
longstanding Board precedent banning surveillance.
Second, the Board began to expand the category of activity that
is unprotected by the NLRA on the grounds that it is disloyal or
37
harmful to the employer. In International Protective Services, Inc.,
the Board held that a strike by building security guards was
unprotected because it occurred during the months of March and
April, which were the months during which attacks on other federal
buildings had occurred (the only attack specified was on the
38
Oklahoma City federal building). Although the majority justified the
strike prohibition on national security grounds, critics of the decision
disputed the need for the rule and worried about its scope: would
employees of government contractors be prohibited from striking

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
Aladdin Gaming, L.L.C., 345 N.L.R.B. 585 (2005).
Id. at 587–88.
Id.
Id. at 589–90 (Liebman, Member, dissenting in part).
Int’l Protective Servs., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 701 (2003).
Id. at 702–03.
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during any month in which a terrorist attack occurred? Under what
other circumstances might section 7 rights be subordinate to national
39
security concerns? In Endicott Interconnect Technologies, Inc.,
40
employees complained on a blog about mass layoffs. In a newspaper
article in which a company manager defended the layoff by saying
that he had a “fiduciary responsibility to make this business
profitable,” an employee was quoted as saying he thought the layoff
was not in the best interest of the company because people with
important knowledge were let go “leaving voids in the critical
knowledge base,” and that a union might “help to stop the job losses,
41
and root for the workers of the community.” The employee was
42
fired for his statements. Although two members of the Board found
the comments to be protected by section 7, Chairman Battista would
have found that the comments were unprotected because the
employee had not been laid off, his comments did not specifically
refer to a labor dispute, and the comments disparaged the company
43
and its management.
44
Third, in the Register-Guard decision discussed extensively
below, the Board also limited section 7 protections both in the union
and nonunion workplace by deciding that the NLRA does not protect
the right of employees to use company email servers to engage in
45
section 7 activity. The impact of the Register-Guard decision is
substantial in and of itself, as email has increasingly replaced face-toface or telephone communication in many workplaces. But it is even
more significant when considered alongside Aladdin Gaming, which
enhanced an employer’s power to have supervisors monitor employee
lunchtime or break time conversations and to join the conversation to
46
argue against unionization. Aladdin Gaming and Register-Guard
together enable a determined employer to prevent employees from
having private communications about unionization during
nonworking time; any communication about unions without
supervisory monitoring and intervention would have to occur away
from work on private phones or email accounts.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 448 (2005).
Id. at 448–49.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 452–53 (Battista, Chairman, dissenting).
Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007).
Id. at 1114–16.
See Aladdin Gaming, L.L.C., 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 587–88 (2005).
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2. Section 7 Protection for Concerted Activity Unrelated to
Unions. A second significant retreat of the Bush Board was its
withdrawal of section 7 protection for conduct that has nothing to do
with forming a union. Section 7 broadly protects not only the right to
join or assist unions, but also the right “to engage in other concerted
47
activities for mutual aid or protection.” Section 7 could be read as
providing general antiretaliation protection for all forms of worker
activism, so long as the activism is “concerted” and for “mutual aid or
protection.” As union density has declined, the applicability of
section 7 outside the union context has gained in importance. The
Board, with the support of the Supreme Court, has at various points
48
affirmed that section 7 applies broadly. The Board’s willingness to
extend the protections of the statute beyond activities related to
unionization has ebbed and flowed over time, with Republican
Boards taking a narrow view of the scope of section 7 and Democratic
Boards finding it to have broader applicability in nonunion
workplaces.
Continuing the pattern of oscillation, the Clinton Board held that
section 7 protected a variety of instances of conduct unrelated to
union organizing, such as an employee’s use of email to complain
49
about a proposed change in vacation days or a trio of employees
who together filed unemployment compensation claims during a
50
summer layoff. In contrast, the Bush II Board held that section 7
does not protect the effort of an employee to persuade a coworker to
testify at an administrative hearing on allegations of sexual
51
harassment and does not protect nurses who called a state
department of health hotline to complain about excessive heat in the
52
nursing home where they worked. Whereas in the sexual harassment
case, the Board reasoned that the worker activism was unprotected
53
because it was solely about her own working conditions, in the

47. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
48. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570–76 (1978) (concluding that section 7
protects distribution of leaflets urging support for an increase in the minimum wage, urging
opposition to the enactment of a state right to work law, and generally urging workers to
support politicians who were friends of labor, even though none of the political activity
mentioned in the leaflet would directly affect the employees’ working conditions).
49. Timekeeping Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 245–47 (1997).
50. Tri-Country Transp., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1154 (2000).
51. Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 301, 301 (2004).
52. Orchard Park Health Care Ctr., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 642 (2004).
53. Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. at 309.
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nursing home case the Board found the hotline call unprotected
because it was not about their own conditions (in the Board’s view,
the call was motivated by concern about patients, not about
54
workers).
The Bush II Board also rejected Clinton Board precedent on the
question whether section 7 protects the right of a nonunion employee
to have a coworker present during a disciplinary interview. The Bush
II Board held that section 7 offers that protection only to union
55
employees. On this issue, the Bush II Board overturned a Clinton
Board decision, which had held that asking for a coworker to be
present during a disciplinary interview is “concerted activity” and that
56
it is for “mutual aid or protection.” This is an issue on which the
Board has flipped with almost every change in the party occupying
the White House: the Clinton Board’s broad reading of section 7 had
57
overturned a Reagan Board decision, which itself had overturned a
58
decision from the end of the Carter Board era.
The Board also narrowed prior precedent which had held that
employer rules that broadly prohibit “abusive” or “profane” language
or verbal harassment were invalid if they were likely to have a chilling
59
effect on section 7 activity. In Martin Luther Memorial Home, a split
Board held that such rules are valid on their face but can be
challenged if in specific instances they prohibit section 7 speech (such
60
as the right to call a strikebreaker a “scab”). Three years later, in
61
Albertson’s, Inc., a majority of a divided Board further limited the
scope of section 7 by upholding a rule prohibiting off-the-job conduct
that “has a negative effect on the [c]ompany’s reputation or operation
62
or employee morale or productivity.” In so ruling, the Board
distinguished prior Board precedent which had held that overbroad

54. Orchard Park Health Care, 341 N.L.R.B. at 643.
55. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1288 (2004).
56. Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 680 (2000).
57. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 232 (1985) (reversing Materials Research
Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982), which held that a right to union representation at a disciplinary
interview extended to nonunionized employees).
58. See Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016.
59. Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004).
60. Id. at 647.
61. Albertson’s, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 254 (2007).
62. Id. at 375.
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workplace rules regulating the tone or content of speech might chill
63
section 7 speech.
3. The Overlap Between Political and Labor Activism. The Bush
II Board’s General Counsel also contributed to this narrowing of
section 7 rights. The largest exercises of concerted worker activism
since 2000 have been the massive “Day Without an Immigrant” rallies
64
held in major cities across the United States every May 1. Tens of
thousands of immigrants and supporters of immigrants’ rights
marched to highlight exploitation of immigrant labor, to protest harsh
restrictions on immigration, and to celebrate the value of immigrants
and immigrant labor for American culture and the economy. These
were about as close to a general strike as the American economy has
seen in generations. Not surprisingly, several unfair labor practice
charges were filed after each year’s rallies when workers were fired
for participating in them. The Bush II Board rejected statutory
65
protection for these workers.
4. Exclusion of Workers from Statutory Protection through a
Narrow Definition of “Employee”. The labor critique of the Bush II
Board is not merely that it shifted the law too far in favor of

63. See Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 291, 293 (2000),
enforcement denied in part, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330
N.L.R.B. 287, 287–88 (1999); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 833 (1998). The Adtranz
and Lafayette cases are discussed in William R. Corbett, The Narrowing of the National Labor
Relations Act: Maintaining Workplace Decorum and Avoiding Liability, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 23, 41–44 (2006).
64. See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Immigrants Take to U.S. Streets in Show of Strength,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A1; Jenalia Moreno, Cynthia Leonor Garza & Eyder Peralta, Fears
Didn’t Deter Protests: Thousands of Migrants Join In Despite Worries of Losing Jobs, Rumors of
Raids, HOUSTON CHRON., May 3, 2006, at B1.
65. See generally Am. Cable Co., N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Memorandum 4-CA-34669
(Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/2007/4-CA34669.pdf (concluding that even if participation in the “Day Without Immigrants” rallies is
protected under section 7, the employer was nevertheless justified in discharging employees
because of the harm work stoppages cause to business); Fire Fab., Inc., N.L.R.B Gen. Couns.
Advice Memorandum 32-CA-22668 (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_
files/Advice%20Memos/2006/32-CA-22668.pdf; CALMEX, Inc., N.L.R.B Gen. Couns. Advice
Memorandum 32-CA-22651 (Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/
Advice%20Memos/2006/32-CA-22651.pdf (concluding the same); Reliable Maint., N.L.R.B
Gen. Couns. Advice Memorandum 18-CA-18119 (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.
nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/2006/18-CA-18119.pdf (concluding the same). For a
general discussion of whether section 7 protects worker participation in such rallies, see Michael
C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of the Treatment of Immigration
Rallies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 93 (2007).
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management (labor has probably made that critique about every
Republican-dominated Board for years). The new critique is that the
Board made labor law protections unattainable for the nontraditional
66
workers who are most likely to seek collective bargaining rights.
First, as noted, the Bush II Board resisted efforts to apply the
protections of the NLRA to nonunion workers other than in the
context of union organizing. Given the small fraction of the
workforce that is unionized, the Board is irrelevant to the vast
67
majority of workers. Second, in defining the workers protected by
the full panoply of statutory protections to exclude many of those
engaged in union organizing, including those on the border of
supervisory positions, those on the border of being independent
contractors, and immigrants not authorized to work, the Board—
sometimes on its own and sometimes at the direction of the Supreme
Court—renders itself less significant to the modern workforce than it
68
might be.

66. Some of the critiques—many of which are partisan—include William B. Gould IV,
Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of Labor-Management Relations: The
Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461 (2007) (Gould, a Stanford law
professor, was Chair of the NLRB during the Clinton administration); Jonathan P. Hiatt &
Craig Becker, Response, At Age 70 Should the Wagner Act Be Retired? A Response to Professor
Dannin, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293 (2005) (Hiatt and Becker are prominent unionside lawyers and Becker was formerly a law professor at UCLA); Wilma Liebman, Essay,
Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 (2007) (Liebman, who was appointed Chair of the NLRB by
President Obama, was originally appointed to the Board by President Clinton and was a unionside lawyer before entering government service).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 55–56; see also Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality
Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own Obsolescence?, 16 LAB. LAW. 201, 201 (2000)
(discussing neutrality agreements, which allow for unionization outside of the NLRB regulation
and recognition process); Duff, supra note 65, at 150 (arguing that the NLRB should extend
protection to unauthorized workers when appropriate); David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers:
Emerging Labor Organizations—Until They Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 469, 512–13 (2006) (describing work centers as an alternative to
unions for low-wage workers).
68. On the expanding exclusion of supervisors, see NLRB v. Kentucky River Community
Care, 532 U.S. 706 (2001), which held that, in some cases, nurses may qualify as supervisors
under the National Labor Relations Act, id. at 712–13, 717, and Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348
N.L.R.B. 686 (2006), which excluded “rotating charge nurses” as statutory supervisors, id. at
694. In Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 717 (2006), however, the Board found that the lead
persons at a factory did not have supervisory authority because they did not exercise
independent judgment in directing their crew members. Id. at 722. Similarly, in Beverly
Enterprises-Minnesota. Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 727 (2006), the Board held that the employer’s charge
nurses were employees rather than supervisors. Id. at 732. On leased employees, see Oakwood
Care Center, 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004). On independent contractors, see Roadway Package
System, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998), which held that delivery truck drivers are employees, id.
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C. Enforcement and Remedies
1. Section 10(j). Another major policy change on which the
Clinton Board and the Bush II Board differed significantly is
illustrated in the frequency with which the Board sought injunctions
from the federal district courts against ongoing unfair labor practices.
One criticism frequently leveled at the NLRA is that the relative
mildness of the remedies (reinstatement plus back pay) and the
slowness of the administrative process (it can take years from the
filing of a complaint by an aggrieved employee to the issuance of an
enforceable order) creates a huge incentive for employers to
deliberately violate the statute knowing that they will reap the benefit
of illegal conduct for a long time, if not permanently in the case of a
69
successful defeat of an organizing campaign. Efforts to amend the
statute to stiffen the penalties have been filibustered or vetoed. One
thing the Board can do is to seek interim injunctive relief to remove
the incentive for delay.
Under section 10(j) of the NLRA, in any case in which a
Regional Office has issued a complaint charging an unfair labor
practice, the Board is empowered to petition a federal district court
70
for a preliminary injunction against an ongoing unfair labor practice.
The Board has developed an elaborate internal process for handling
10(j) cases, which requires the regional office to seek authorization
71
from the Board’s General Counsel in Washington, D.C. The
General Counsel, in turn, must obtain authorization from the Board
72
before filing a petition in a district court.
The General Counsel of the Clinton Board, and the Board itself,
73
made a major priority of seeking 10(j) injunctions, and the number

at 854, and Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998), which held that delivery
truck drivers are independent contractors, id. at 894. For a discussion of the obstacles that
temporary workers face in their attempts to unionize, see generally Bita Rahebi, Comment,
Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board’s Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting
Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105 (2000).
69. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2006).
71. See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 10200 (2008),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/CHM1/CHM1.pdf.
72. See id.
73. The memoir of Professor William B. Gould IV, the chair of the Clinton Board, explains
the significance of the Board’s section 10(j) initiative. See GOULD, supra note 17, at 65–67, 178–
82, 300–02. Professor Gould’s earlier book, WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM:
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of authorizations grew, as the data in Table 1 reveal, from 26 in 1992
(the last year of the Bush I Board) to 104 in 1995. During the Clinton
Administration, the lowest number of 10(j) authorizations was 43.
During the Bush II Administration, the highest number of 10(j)
authorizations was 28, and the lowest, reached in 2005, was 15.

THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE LAW (1993), made the case for
various procedural reforms to increase incentives for compliance with labor law.
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Table 1. Injunctions against Ongoing Unfair Labor Practices under
74
Section 10(j)
FY

Total 10(j)
Requests
Received

Authorizations

Board
Denials

10(j)
Petitions

Success
Rate

86
68
69
61
70
90
87
99
154
115
104
124
131
259
207
137

GC 10(j)
Requests
to
Board
—
39
30
22
22
24
26
43
73
58
53
62
59
109
85
42

2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993

28
25
25
15
14
17
16
43
68
45
45
53
53
104
83
42

—
3
0
3
4
3
0
0
4
1
4
6
4
6
0
1

18
21
22
11
10
14
15
29
45
27
32
36
39
78
62
34

84%
86%
94%
93%
100%
100%
73%
88%
86%
85%
95%
87%
91%
91%
82%
FY 1989–
1993
91%

1992
1991
1990
1989
1988

116
142
157
163
166

27
36
41
62
44

26
38
39
62
43

0
1
0
1
0

24
32
31
48
33

1987
1986
1985
1984
1983

155
163
168
195
309

37
45
42
40
71

37
43
38
30
51

1
0
3
15
18

29
41
24
26
34

1982
1981
1980
1979

255
301
272
262

58
71
82
80

53
71
81
80

5
0
1
0

44
54
57
N.A.

1978
1977
1976

260
219
160

53
62
27

51
62
26

2
0
1

46
55

FY 1985–
1988
89%

1/1/80–
12/31/83
87%

7/1/78–
6/30/79
81%

74. The data in Table 1 were provided to the authors by the NLRB Division of
Information. The data for FY 2008 are drawn from Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, Gen.
Counsel, Office of the U.S. Gen. Counsel, to All Employees of the Office of the U.S. Gen.
Counsel, Summary of Operations (Fiscal Year 2008), at 9–10 (Oct. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2009/GC%2009-03%20Summary%20of%20
Operations%20FY%2008.pdf. Data are not reported for FY 2008 for GC 10(j) requests to the
Board and Board denials because the NLRB delegated 10(j) authority to the General Counsel
during FY 2008 at the time when the Board’s membership fell to two. For a discussion of the
significance of the change in Board policy on section 10(j), see William B. Gould IV, The NLRB
at 70: Some Reflections on the Clinton Board and the Bush II Aftermath, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 309, 316 (2005).
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The almost complete cessation of the practice of seeking
injunctions against ongoing unfair labor practices under section 10(j)
is one of the most dramatic reversals of policy between the Bush II
Board era and the Clinton Board era. It is not one that was
accomplished through adjudication—unlike the policies we discuss
elsewhere in this Article—but instead through discretionary
enforcement practice that is entirely beyond the reach of judicial
review and largely beyond the view of public or congressional
oversight. Indeed, the 2002 General Counsel memorandum
articulating the new enforcement philosophy of the Bush II Board
regarding section 10(j) gave no indication that a dramatic change was
75
intended or should occur.
2. Adjudication Policies and Remedies in Duty to Bargain Cases.
Criticism has also been leveled at the administrative procedures the
Bush II Board adopted for handling other aspects of its caseload.
Some of the changes are highly technical and not readily apparent,
76
such as heightened pleading and proof requirements. But they will
75. Utilization of section 10(j) Proceedings, N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Memorandum 02-07
(Aug. 9, 2002), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2002/gc02-07.html
(“[T]he Section 10(j) program is, and must continue to be, an important tool in administering
the Act.”).
76. In Raley’s Supermarkets & Drug Centers, 349 N.L.R.B. 26 (2007), the Board both
reduced the employer’s duty to disclose information to the union necessary to process
grievances and effectively imposed a heightened pleading requirement on the General Counsel
to prove that the employer failed to provide the union with the information necessary to
represent an employee in a grievance. Id. at 28. In that case, the union twice requested
information that the employer had assembled regarding alleged incidents of harassment and
retaliatory transfer. Id. at 26. The employer simply informed the union that the employees
whom it interviewed had not complained of disrespectful treatment and “we believe the
situation has been addressed and the matter closed.” Id. Only during the hearing on the unfair
labor practice charge did the employer reveal that it had decided that the grievances lacked
merit, it had not prepared a report of its investigation, and it had taken no remedial actions in
response to the allegations. Id. at 27. The Board held that the employer had no duty to provide
witness statements or to inform the union that it had taken no action on the incidents and had
prepared no report of its investigation. The Board also held that the employer’s failure to
inform the union that it had no report was not an unfair labor practice because the General
Counsel had alleged only that the employer failed to provide the report and had not specifically
alleged that the employer failed to inform the union of the nonexistence of the report. Id. at 28.
Although the Board purported to make no new law, the dissent pointed out that cases from the
Clinton Board had found the employer to have a duty to provide investigation reports and files,
and that it suffices for the General Counsel to allege that the employer failed to provide
information rather than having to allege that the employer failed to state that the requested
information did not exist. See id. at 28–30 (Liebman, Member, dissenting) (citing Postal Serv.,
332 N.L.R.B. 635 (2000)); Care Manor of Farmington, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 330 (1995);
Gloversville Embossing Corp., 314 N.L.R.B. 1258 (1994)).
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cumulatively have the effect of making it much harder to prove a case
and, therefore, make it more difficult for the regional attorneys, who
are the enforcement arm of the Board, to bring cases.
Another area of acute regulatory failure (at least from the
standpoint of labor) is the failure of the Board and the courts to
develop remedies for bad faith bargaining. During the last decade,
nearly half of all newly certified unions failed to reach a collective
bargaining agreement, up from one-third of new unions that failed to
77
secure a first contract in the early 1990s. Scholars, Board members,
and judges have complained for years that an employer determined to
thwart unionization can bargain endlessly without ever reaching
agreement unless the union has sufficient political or labor market
78
power to force an employer to come to terms. Although section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA imposes a duty to bargain in good faith, the
Supreme Court long ago decided that the Board lacks the authority to
force a recalcitrant (or even an illegally recalcitrant) party to reach
79
agreement. It will simply order the party who bargained in bad faith

In St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961 (2007), the Board majority switched the
burden of proof from the employer to the General Counsel to show mitigation of damages in
the case of illegal discharge. Id. at 961. In other cases, the Board changed rules in ways that
make it more difficult to prove or to recover remedies in cases involving unfair labor practices
against “salt,” union members who apply for jobs for purposes of organizing a workplace. See
Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 234 (2007); Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B.
1348, 1353 (2007).
77. John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing
Drives, 1999–2004, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 16 (2008); see also DUNLOP COMM’N, THE
DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS:
FINAL REPORT 39 (2004) (observing that “[r]oughly a third of workplaces that vote to be
represented by a union do not obtain a collective bargaining contract”).
78. See, e.g., DUNLOP COMM’N, supra note 77, at 45 (describing proposals that would
mandate arbitration in cases of bad faith bargaining, and concluding that it is difficult to
distinguish between bad faith bargaining and “permissible hard bargaining”); Charles J. Morris,
The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective Bargaining Process: A Fresh Look at the
Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies, 30 VAND. L. REV. 661, 668 (1977)
(observing that the duty to bargain does not fully capture the “grey area” touching upon
“entrepreneurial decision-making” when there is little expectation of reaching an agreement);
Theodore St. Antoine, A Touchstone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039, 1046
(1968) (arguing that “the fact that a contract might not have emerged from bargaining does not
necessarily preclude” compensation under the NLRA).
79. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970); see also NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952) (“[T]he Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements.”).
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80

to bargain more. Here, as elsewhere, the problem is not solely of the
Board’s own making, for the Supreme Court early adopted a view of
the Board’s regulatory authority that was arguably narrower than the
81
statutory language compelled. One provision of the Employee Free
Choice Act would rectify the problem by providing for interest
82
arbitration in the case of a failure to bargain to a first contract. Here,
the Board, informed by social science data about the reasons for the
failure of newly certified unions to obtain first collective bargaining
agreements, might be able to take a creative approach to the remedial
powers it has, because its own refusal to issue make-whole or other
remedies in such cases has been controversial ever since a narrowly
83
divided Board declined to assert such power in 1970.
II. THE BUSH II BOARD AND THE HYBRID NLRA
The Bush II Board’s philosophy is a manifestation of one of two
polar conceptions of the NLRA, and it is a position that must be
taken seriously. The interpretation and implementation of the NLRA
straddles a major fault line. The NLRA is an amalgam of two statutes,
84
the Wagner Act (1935) and the Taft-Hartley Act (1947). They arose

80. See, e.g., J. FREEDLEY HUNSICKER, JR., JONATHAN KANE & PETER D. WALTHER, JR.,
NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (2d ed. 1986).
81. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, added as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, defines the duty to
bargain in general terms with the proviso that “such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). Scholars,
courts, and Board members have debated for decades whether this language compels the
conclusion that no remedy can be imposed that would have the effect of preventing a strong
employer from, as one scholar put it, “talk[ing] a union to death.” See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1412–13 (1958) (“As long as there are
unions weak enough to be talked to death, there will be employers who are tempted to engage
in the forms of collective bargaining without the substance. The concept of ‘good faith’ was
brought into the law of collective bargaining as a solution to this problem.”).
82. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 110 Cong. § 3 (2009).
83. In Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), the Board split 3 to 2 on the question
whether the Board could issue compensatory remedies for failures to bargain in good faith. Id.
at 114. As scholars have pointed out, ample data based on the employer’s contracts at other
unionized plants enabled relatively precise calculation of the economic harms caused to
employees by the employer’s illegal conduct, and state labor boards do issue compensatory
remedies in failure-to-bargain cases. See George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. ALRB, 783 P.2d 749,
758 (Cal. 1989) (observing that when the employer’s “election challenges are merely a stalling
tactic designed to thwart union organization,” makeshift compensation by the Board
“compensate[s] the employees for the actual loss of the opportunity to negotiate an
agreement”).
84. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 (1985)
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under diametrically opposed historical circumstances, and were aimed
at correcting diametrically opposed abuses of power. One could
encapsulate much labor law practice and scholarship as answers to the
question, “How radically pro-union was the Wagner Act, and how
radically anti-union was Taft-Hartley?” When left labor scholars
(particularly those speaking with the hope of shoring up labor law
against further erosion) talk to outsiders, they portray the Wagner
Act as a transformative, pro-union, pro-collective bargaining “super85
statute” and Taft-Hartley as an amendment that whittled away at
the margins of union and NLRB abuses of power but did nothing to
86
change the pro-union, pro-bargaining thrust of the statute. But there
are, in fact, genuine debates among legal historians and other labor
scholars on both of these questions. Some agree that the Wagner Act
was transformational but view Taft-Hartley as a catastrophic
87
reshaping of the field. Others are sharp critics of the view of the
Wagner Act as radical, and see Taft-Hartley as merely an adjustment
88
in what was already a compromised statute. Even among those who
see the Wagner Act as radical at its origins, many believe that the
Supreme Court clipped its wings almost immediately because the

(tracing the historical development of the National Labor Relations Act, including the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Amendments).
85. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1227
(2001) (developing the concept of super-statutes and using the NLRA as an example).
86. See Nelson Lichtenstein, Politicized Unions and the New Deal Model: Labor, Business
and Taft-Hartley, in THE NEW DEAL AND THE TRIUMPH OF LIBERALISM 135, 138 (Sidney M.
Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2002) (discussing the work of George Lipsitz and David
Plotke); see also Estlund, supra note 11, at 1533–35 (“The Taft-Hartley Act . . . represented a
major setback for the labor movement. . . . But the 1947 amendments worked largely by
addition, not subtraction; they left the core provisions of the original New Deal text—and in
particular the existing employer unfair labor practices—essentially intact.”); cf. Archibald Cox,
Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 274 (1961)
(arguing that Taft-Hartley “appears to reject the policy of encouraging the spread of collective
bargaining, [and] accepts the institution where it already exists”).
87. See, e.g., Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV.
763, 765 (1998); see also Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, The Postwar Paradigm in American
Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1518–65 (1981) (discussing industrial pluralism and its negative
impact on labor unions).
88. See, e.g., Lichtenstein, supra note 86, at 138–41 (describing the work of scholars, like
Christopher Tomlins, who critique the Wagner Act as statist and therefore do not see TaftHartley as a deradicalization of the Wagner Act, and then arguing that this position is
inconsistent with the historical evidence of the urgency with which labor’s supporters opposed
Taft-Hartley); cf. TOMLINS, supra note 84, at 280 (contrasting the rhetoric of labor’s supporters
regarding Taft-Hartley’s alleged radicalization with the law’s modest substantive changes).
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Court was unprepared to conclude that Congress meant to undercut
89
core managerial prerogatives as the cost of labor peace.
The conservative wing of the Bush II Board took the position
that, after Taft-Hartley, the NLRB is supposed to be neutral toward
collective bargaining and especially protective of the right of
employees to resist unionization and the right of employers to speak
their minds during union election campaigns—rights placed in the
statute by Taft-Hartley in response to perceived NLRB pro-union
bias. The liberal wing of the Board took the position that the NLRA
should encourage collective bargaining and protect pro-union
90
employees from employer abuses of power. Put differently, the
conservatives think it is their highest mission to avoid false positives
(that is, collectivization of employees who do not genuinely want to
unionize), and the liberals, false negatives (that is, exclusion of
employees who genuinely want unions from the benefits of
collectivization).
Both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act used federal
labor regulation to prevent bargaining disputes between employees
and firms from mushrooming into industrial unrest and, in the case of
the Wagner Act, to achieve a modicum of wealth redistribution by
enhancing the power of employees to negotiate collectively. The
Wagner Act declared employers’ militant refusal to recognize unions
as the major cause of industrial unrest, and the abuse of employer
89. See ATLESON, supra note 8, at 19–34; Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265,
292–93 (1978); Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, The Future of Collective Bargaining: A Review
Essay, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 484–85 (1989) (book review) (“Both Professor Karl Klare and I
have argued that the Wagner Act grew out of a widespread perception that there was a public
interest and a public stake in the fairness of the terms of the wage bargain. Accordingly, the Act
brought labor issues into the public arena and made it a legitimate role of government to
intervene to equalize the bargaining power of labor and management. We both claim that
despite this mission, the Wagner Act has been interpreted so as to relegate labor issues back to
the private realm.”); cf. Julius G. Getman and Thomas Kohler, The Story of NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co.: The High Cost of Solidarity, in LABOR LAW STORIES, supra note 14, at
13, 44–46 (arguing that the Wagner Act provided merely a “framework for private ordering, but
not the substance of that order”).
90. The liberal-conservative split was on display during December 13, 2007, joint hearings
before the House Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions, Committee on
Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety,
Committee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions. See The National Labor Relations
Board: Recent Decisions and Their Impact on Workers’ Rights: Joint Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pens. of the H. Comm. on Education & Labor, &
the S. Subcomm. on Employment & Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor
& Pens., 110th Cong. 1–124 (2007).
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economic power as the major obstacle to improved labor standards.
Taft-Hartley saw union militancy as the cause of industrial unrest,
and union coercive tactics as socially damaging rent seeking that
distorted the labor market and threatened capitalist economic
92
growth. The NLRA, the odd marriage between the two, left it to the
NLRB to enforce these inconsistent mandates. The fact of the matter
is that the NLRB’s post-Taft-Hartley mandate is messy, and that
makes it very difficult to find a vantage point for evaluation.
A. Statutory Interpretation of the Hybrid NLRA: Bounded Purpose
The NLRB’s conflicted mandate makes it difficult to determine
whether the agency’s approach to its enabling statute shows fidelity to
statutory purpose. Simplistic purposive statutory interpretation is not
much help in hybridized statutes like the NLRA. In statutes like the
hybrid NLRA, to borrow Hart & Sachs legal process terms, one must
recognize that “[p]urposes . . . may exist in hierarchies or
constellations. E.g. (to give a very simple illustration), to do this only
93
so far as possible without doing that.”
In such situations, the
legislative mandate is “do X (status quo–altering purpose) only
insofar as Y,” when Y—the limits placed on how far Congress is

91. The legislative findings in section 1 of the Wagner Act said “[t]he denial by employers
of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest,” which impairs
commerce or “cause[es] [substantial] diminution of employment and wages,” and that the
inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects
the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry.
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
92. The legislative findings in section 1 of the Taft-Hartley Act said “Experience has
further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and
members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . .
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair
the interest of the public . . . .” Labor Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L.
No. 80-101, § 1, 137, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–66).
93. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1377 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63 (1988) (“To use an algebraic metaphor, law is like a vector.
It has length as well as direction. We must find both, or we know nothing of value. To find
length we must take account of objectives, of means chosen, and of stopping places identified.
All are important.”).
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willing to take X or what methods Congress is prepared to use to
achieve X—are as much a part of the statutory scheme as is the
statute’s affirmative purpose. For example, the winning argument in
94
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber asserted that Title VII
aimed to end discrimination against minorities but only insofar as
doing so did not interfere with management discretion to discriminate
95
in their favor. For lack of a better label in the statutory
interpretation literature for this approach, we shall call it bounded
96
purpose.
In the analysis of bounded purpose, much turns on the relative
weights accorded to X and Y. In some cases, Y is an outer limit on X,
but in cases of uncertainty, it is preferable to have too much X than
too little. In these cases, Y is but a marginal correction to X; we work
harder to avoid false negatives than false positives. But when Y is
weighed equal to or more heavily than X, bounded purpose is binding
indeed. Burdens of persuasion can be strong evidence of the relative
weight of X and Y. As elaborated in Weber’s successor case in the
Supreme Court, for example, voluntary affirmative action plans are
97
presumed not to count as discriminatory unless proven invalid —
making it clear that Y is being weighted more heavily than X—
despite the fact that X (antidiscrimination) is present in the text of the
statute and Y is not. Viewing the hybrid NLRA through the lens of
bounded purpose, the question is whether the affirmative
commitments of Taft-Hartley (Y) merely limit the affirmative
commitments of the Wagner Act (X) at the margins; whether they are
94. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In this case, the Supreme
Court upheld voluntary affirmative action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at
197.
95. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173, 212–13, 218–19 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006).
96. The specific Hart & Sacks language quoted in text is not included in the legislation
casebook coauthored by the editors of the Hart & Sacks legal process materials. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 697 (3d ed. 2001)
(substituting a paraphrase). The concept we call bounded purpose may fall within the casebook
editors’ concept of imaginative reconstruction, which they draw in part from the work of Judge
Richard Posner. See id. at 684–85, 685 n.n. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286–93 (1985)). Judge Posner suggests that Hart and Sacks are
“reluctan[t] to recognize that statutes often are the product of compromise between opposing
groups and that a compromise is unlikely to embody a single consistent purpose.” POSNER,
supra, at 289. Bounded purpose is a way of expressing the purposeful—as opposed to the purely
strategic—nature of at least some legislative compromises.
97. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1987).
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coequal in importance; or whether Taft-Hartley’s commitments
98
trump the original Wagner Act when the two come info conflict.
In our view, bounded purpose is the right approach to the
NLRA. Pursuant to that approach, we believe that although TaftHartley does not trump the Wagner Act, it does more than tinker at
its margins. Certainly Taft-Hartley manifests a strong congressional
judgment that collective bargaining is not unassailably good, and that
problems with collective bargaining as it actually exists on the ground
are of central concern to the formation of federal labor policy. When
combined with the management-protective limitations so early
imposed by the Supreme Court on the Wagner Act itself, the TaftHartley Act makes it impossible to view the combined NLRA as an
99
unabashedly pro-collective bargaining charter. That, we think, is as
far as generalities about the relationship between the two statutes can
take us. Beyond that, the field is faced with the extremely difficult
task of forging a contemporary labor policy from old and conflicting
statutory enactments. Given the death of the nondelegation doctrine,
one must work on the assumption that the impossibility of the task
does not make it go away.
B. Law versus Policy under the NLRA
There are, to be sure, plenty of routine cases on the Board’s
docket that do not implicate the fault line we have described. Indeed,
at the end of the Bush II Administration, a two-member, two-party
Board continued to work through a substantial portion of the Board’s
docket, in part by agreeing to apply Board precedent and to seek
compromise on fact-finding when the “facts of the case can

98. This vocabulary is both less absolutist and far more useful than is, for example, reliance
on the formalistic “canon against implied repeals.” For a critique of the canon, see Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
800, 812–13 (1983). The canon would seem particularly inapt when the later statute is explicitly
formulated as an amendment to the earlier statute.
99. Cf. Estlund, supra note 11, at 1528 (“As for collective bargaining, it is hard to be
against the idea of fostering negotiations between the managers of an enterprise and the
workers, speaking through their chosen representatives, over wages and working conditions.
Putting aside the particular choices that labor and management have made (some of which now
appear rigid and inefficient), and some of the particular embellishments added by the labor laws,
collective bargaining in its essence responds to current demands for flexible accommodation to
the market, to local conditions, and to change. It is at least potentially decentralized, tailored to
local circumstances, flexible, and democratic.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
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100

reasonably be interpreted in more than one way.” But when it
comes to legally significant cases, the underlying debate is generally
unavoidable.
The NLRB’s task is especially open-ended because so few of the
major cases coming before the Board are statutory interpretation
cases as that category is commonly understood: that is, as questions of
101
law to be answered by analyzing text and legislative history. A
surprisingly large proportion of legally significant Board cases do not
102
rest on any specific statutory language at all. In others, the statutory
103
language is either open-ended or circular. Often there is no helpful
100. Schaumber, Liebman Discuss Dynamics of Two-Member Board, DAILY LABOR REP.,
Sep. 18, 2008, at 2. The legality of a two-member Board deciding cases was recently upheld by
the First Circuit, and remains under challenge elsewhere. Ne. Land Servs. Ltd. v. NLRB, No.
08-1878, 2009 WL 638248, at *5 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 2009) (upholding the legality of a two-member
board); Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 08-1162 & 08-1214 (D.C.
Cir. oral arguments held Dec. 4, 2008); DAILY LABOR REP., supra (noting other possible
challenges). Members Schaumber and Liebman have, however, continued a general Board
practice of indicating in opinions that one or the other would prefer to reexamine precedent but
decline to do so “for institutional reasons.” See, e.g., Lorge School & Linda Cooperman, 352
N.L.R.B. 119, 119 & n.5 (2008) (Schaumber); Resistflame Acquisition Co., 353 N.L.R.B. 1, 2–3
& n.3 (2009) (Liebman).
101. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild: An Old-Fashioned Remedy
for What Ails Current Judicial Review Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 981, 987–88 (2006) (“In
policymaking, agencies are not to parse language, delve into legislative history, or engage in the
other interpretive strategies. Rather, they are to make permissible, but not mandated,
judgments based on legislative facts developed for that purpose. Courts may not ignore
Congress and take over this function by converting into interpretation. . . . [especially when] the
policy expressed in the statute is inchoate, incomplete, or insufficiently specific and the agency
must actually make policy, not just find it in the statutory language.”); see also Ronald M. Levin,
The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1289 (1997)
(citing Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 41 F.3d 721,
727 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (“When Congress’ instructions are conveyed at a high level of generality,
an agency is not likely to consider its action as ‘interpretation’ of the authorizing statute, nor is
that action likely to be challenged as ‘misinterpretation.’ (Yet even then, the agency would be
expected to assert that a particular decision was shaped by the general policy concerns that
animated the legislation.)”); Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1299, 1318 (1997) (stressing the “instrumental character” of agency policymaking in the
face of unclear congressional commands).
102. This is in part an artifact of the lack of legislative activity in the field. See Estlund, supra
note 11, at 1530–44.
103. For example, the NLRA defines “employee” entirely circularly as follows: “The term
‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). Similarly, the NLRA protects, but does not define,
“the right to strike.” Id. § 163. The NLRA prohibits secondary boycotts (although it does not
use that term) in terms so broad that, read literally, would prohibit primary strikes and picketing
that are clearly protected by the NLRA, and it prohibits certain uses of picketing without
defining what constitutes picketing. See generally JULIUS G. GETMAN, BERTRAND B. POGREBIN
& DAVID L. GREGORY, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 267, 277 (2d ed.
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legislative history. The Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation in
NLRA cases often turns on nothing more than statements about the
underlying purposes of the statute, and shows the same incapacity the
Board manifests when it comes to how to prioritize Wagner Act
104
versus Taft-Hartley formulations of those purposes. The Court
often purports to be so sure of the right answer that, either explicitly
or in retrospect, it deems its decision to have been made at Chevron
105
Step One. But, in many cases, the issue is more accurately described
as a question of policy rather than as a question of law, and the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard for discretionary policymaking is
106
the standard the Court should be applying. The line between
1999) (“The Act does not define picketing . . . . The Board, however, has interpreted ‘picketing’
liberally, focusing on some type of union activity near the entrances to the employer’s business
and the results of such activity.”).
104. Examples of this approach to statutory purpose abound in the area of the duty to
bargain in good faith, and the views of the statutory purpose are often thought to reflect a
tension between two divergent purposes. In one view, a more interventionist view, the purpose
of labor law is to facilitate a rational bargaining process that will produce agreement, and the
Board and the courts are empowered to find particular bargaining tactics illegal based on the
harm they cause to the process. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 738–39 (1962) (holding
that a unilateral change in terms before bargaining to impasse violates the duty to bargain);
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1956) (holding that the employer must provide
information to the union to support its claim that the company could not afford a particular
contract term). In another, more laissez-faire view, the purpose of labor law is only to provide
the outer boundaries of economic struggle, and the Board lacks the power to regulate the
fairness or rationality of the process. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477,
484 (1960) (holding that parties may use economic power away from the bargaining table to
secure a more favorable agreement, and saying that “the most basic purpose” of the duty to
bargain is to force the employer and union to negotiate but “what happens behind [the] doors
[of the negotiating room] is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it”).
105. For example, in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), the Court refused to
defer to the Board’s interpretation of the statutory term “employee” as including people
employed by unions or by other employers who were attempting to organize employees at a
worksite at which they did not work. Id. at 540–41. The Court, disregarding the statutory
definition of “employee” as including “any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer,” insisted that the organizers in question were not employees and
therefore that neither they, nor the people who worked on the property, had rights to have them
distribute literature in a shopping mall parking lot. Id. The Court said, “in Chevron
terms . . . section 7 speaks to the issue of nonemployee access to an employer’s property.” Id. at
537. For the significance of the distinction between Chevron Steps One and Two, see National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005).
106. For example, when Justice White raised the question, in Lechmere, whether the old
statutory interpretation precedent being used in that case would be understood as a Chevron
Step One or a Chevron Step Two decision, Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 545–47 (White, J., dissenting),
he was asking the wrong question. The better question would be whether that precedent
concerned law or policy. More attention has been paid by the Court to the line between board
fact-finding and policymaking, see Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,
366–80 (1997), than to the line between law and policy under the NLRA.
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Chevron Step Two and the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as
107
applied to discretionary policy is by no means clear. Both ask courts
to defer to reasonable agency decisions. The line between Chevron
Step One and the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, however, is
clear. The arbitrary-and-capricious standard gives the Board great
discretion to make and change policy; Chevron Step One gives the
agency no discretion to interpret statutory language that the courts
108
find to be unambiguous.
C. The Bush II Board’s Fundamental Policy Conflict
A succinct illustration of the internal policy rift in the Bush II
Board concerns the Dana case and the issue of voluntary recognition
via card check. The following debate during a December 2007
congressional oversight hearing not long after the Dana decision
highlights the political controversy over the activities of the Bush II
109
Board.
Both the Republican and the Democratic members of the Board
used the hearing to articulate their views on card-check recognition
and the balance between the right of employers to persuade their
employees to exercise their rights to refuse to join unions and the
rights of employees to join unions without intimidation by their
employers. Yet neither side addressed the nature of the Board’s
decisionmaking process as being an issue. Inasmuch as several of the
witnesses were Board members, it is not surprising that they did not
fault themselves for failing to rely on empirical data. They focused
their criticism of the Dana case on whose approach was truer to the
real meaning of the NLRA. Republican Board Chair Battista
testified:
[O]ur critics lose sight of the fact that the statute was amended in
1947 by the Taft-Hartley Act to protect employees from not only
employer interference, but also union misconduct and to give
employees the equal right to refrain from union activities and
representation. . . .

107. See, e.g., Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 297, 314–18 (2004) (discussing the uncertain relationship between State Farm hard look
review and Chevron Step Two).
108. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83.
109. The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and Their Impact on Workers’
Rights, supra note 90 passim.
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The statute was not intended to benefit unions or employers.
Rather, the rights granted by the statute belong only to employees
whether unionized or not. Once again, the fundamental principle of
the act is to provide for employee free choice, allowing employees to
decide for themselves whether they wish to be represented by a
union or to otherwise act concertedly in dealing with their employer.
110
The law is neutral, and so is this agency.

Member Liebman, in contrast, disputed the characterization that the
Board is “neutral” and indifferent as to whether employees unionize
or not. She said:
[T]he board has pretty expressly stated for the first time in the
board’s history that freedom of choice—and in this case, that would
be the freedom to reject union representation—has paramount
value in this statute over the goal of promoting collective bargaining.
That is the first time that the NLRB has ever stated that ranking of
111
statutory policies in that way.

Chairman Battista insisted in his testimony that, whatever policy the
Wagner Act had articulated, the Taft-Hartley amendments
eliminated favoring the right to engage in collective bargaining, or
promoting collective bargaining as a favored form of labor relations:
“The fact of the matter is that I think that the Taft-Hartley Act did
112
work changes and did result in a more neutral stance by the Board.”
Member Liebman disagreed:
I guess you could call me a strict constructionist or maybe even an
originalist about this law. I believe that the majority’s apparent
conviction that Taft-Hartley somehow diminished the primacy of
collective bargaining as a national policy goal is just wrong. I would
call it revisionist history.
. . . The law’s overriding aim was and still is to make it possible
for workers to freely choose collective representation and to
promote collective bargaining. . . . [E]mployees are free under this
statute to choose freely to decline unionization . . . . They have that

110. Id. at 18 (statement of Hon. Robert Battista, Chairman, NLRB) (emphasis added). For
further elaboration of Liebman’s position, see Wilma B. Liebman, Labor Law Inside Out, 11
WORKINGUSA 9, 16–18 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134899.
111. The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and Their Impact on Workers’
Rights, supra note 90, at 61 (statement of Wilma B. Liebman, Member, NLRB).
112. Id. at 78 (statement of Hon. Robert Battista, Chairman, NLRB).
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right. But the fact remains that the primary goal of this statute is to
113
promote collective bargaining.

Frequently during her testimony, as here, Member Liebman
identified the core policy of the Act as the encouragement of
114
“collective bargaining freely chosen.”
That very formulation
straddles the Taft-Hartley/Wagner Act fault line—because it begs the
question of what “freely chosen” really means.
D. Ideology and Policy Change under the NLRA
An important part of the rhetoric of Member Liebman’s
testimony is that Board reversals of precedent can be justified by
changes in conditions on the ground or by the discovery of errors in
the reasoning of a prior Board, but not by changes in ideology.
When changes in the economy or the workplace show that an old
legal rule is outdate [sic] or where experience shows that an old rule
is unworkable, where there are conflicts within the case law that
need to be resolved, or when more careful examination shows that a
prior board’s reasoning was flawed. In all those kinds of situations,
overruling precedent is acceptable and even justified. This is an
administrative agency, not a court.
In my view, when the Clinton board reversed precedent, it did so
for these kinds of reasons that I’ve just outlined . . . . In my view, the
Bush board has done the opposite with respect to overruling
115
precedent.

The problem with this claim is that one determines the meaning
of changes on the ground only by reference to ideology. “Present
conditions” are not merely a matter of raw facts—like, for example,
the steady and sharpening decline in private-sector union density
since its high point in the 1950s. The evaluation of present conditions
also requires an understanding of what is causing the decline, and of
whether the decline is a good, bad, or neutral phenomenon from the
116
standpoint of the agency’s statutory mandate. For the conservatives,
unionization has become much more the exception than the rule and
113. Id. at 64 (statement of Wilma B. Liebman, Member, NLRB).
114. Id. at 64, 77, 78.
115. Id. at 76–77.
116. Cf. Brudney, supra note 11, at 253 (arguing that the weakening of the labor movement
for reasons external to the NLRB “has surely helped to marginalize the status of the agency”).
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there is no reason to think of unionization and collective bargaining
as the default “best practice” in industry. Furthermore, conservatives
(ironically echoing the left critics of state-dependent unions) see
success in collective bargaining as dependent upon unions’ actual
economic strength, which is in turn dependent upon solidarity rather
117
than upon law. For the liberals, collective bargaining is taken
without question to be the best practice, both in “fact” and in federal
118
labor policy, so that declining union density means that it is in the
public interest to give unions more power to organize. That is a pretty
fundamental difference in how the raw facts on the ground are
interpreted.
The Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley were both passed in periods
of mass union militancy. In the former case, the union cause was seen
as consistent with the public interest; in the latter case, it was seen as
antithetical to the public interest. Applying the combined NLRA to a
period in which economic conditions are hard and mass militancy is
119
rare makes for difficult policy judgments. Whatever the answers to
these questions, they are not to be found in the language of the
statute, nor are they likely to emerge from the adjudicated factual
record presented in individual cases. They are to be found in the
necessarily ideologically informed interpretation of changed
circumstances.
III. THE BUILT-IN LIMITS OF THE NLRB
AS A POLICYMAKING AGENCY
Unfortunately, the Board is not exactly well constituted to make
defensible policy determinations for reasons that have been endemic
to the Board from its very beginnings. It is to that problem we turn
next. In this Part of the Article, we explore four significant features of
the design of the NLRB that have created challenges for NLRB
policymaking: the statutory ban on the Board hiring economists, the
isolation of the Board from other labor policymaking governmental
bodies, the dominance of lawyers on the Board, and the quasi-judicial

117. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR
WHEN IT’S FLAT ON ITS BACK 3–8 (1991).
118. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 11, at 1528 (“As for collective bargaining, it is hard to be
against the idea of fostering negotiations between managers of an enterprise and the workers,
speaking through their chosen representatives, over wages and working conditions.”).
119. On the history of the NLRA and the divergent policy goals of the Wagner Act and the
Taft-Hartley Act, see generally TOMLINS, supra note 84, and sources cited supra note 86.
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and highly doctrinal style of reasoning the Board generally uses in its
decisions.
A. The Early War against Board Policymaking and Social-Scientific
Expertise
Landis’s hopes for administrative law in the area of labor
relations were doomed to be disappointed from the start. President
Roosevelt was not initially prepared to make the Wagner Act a high
priority; he needed to be persuaded to support it, and gave the statute
120
his “tepid public blessing” only once it was certain to pass. Frances
Perkins, the influential Secretary of Labor during the Roosevelt
administration, thought it would be a big mistake to create the NLRB
as an independent agency outside the Labor Department, but she lost
121
that battle in the Senate and, eventually, in the statute as enacted.
Almost everyone expected the Wagner Act to be held
unconstitutional, an expectation that became a near certainty when
the Supreme Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act
122
in the Schechter Poultry case. The NLRA was under consideration
in Congress when the case came down, and opposition dried up as
certainty rose that the statute would be held unconstitutional and was
123
therefore not worth fighting. Employer noncompliance hamstrung
the NLRB and rendered it powerless until the Supreme Court
decided in 1937 to uphold the constitutionality of the NLRA in

120. JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A
STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW VOLUME I (1933–1937), at 147 (1974)
[hereinafter GROSS, MAKING] (quoting Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and
Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199, 203 (1960)). For general discussion of the
statute’s passage, see GROSS, MAKING, supra, at 142–47. For other sources on the history of the
National Labor Relations Board, see generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933–1941 (1970); JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION
1937–1947 (1981) [hereinafter GROSS, RESHAPING]. One of the authors has done archival work
on the Board during this period, in the National Archives Record Groups 25 (National Labor
Relations Board) and 174 (Department of Labor), and at the Wisconsin Historical Archives in
the papers of David Saposs, the Board’s first and only Head of the Department of Economic
Research. Those materials will be cited as “RG25”, “RG174”, and “Saposs”, respectively.
121. John L. Lewis of the American Federation of Labor supported Perkins’s position
because labor already felt comfortable with Perkins and with its level of influence in her
Department of Labor. RG25, Former Chairmen, Box 1, 1935 Biddle, unmarked folder
(Substance of John L. Lewis’s Remarks 1 (Mar. 19, 1935)).
122. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
123. GROSS, MAKING, supra note 120, at 142–45.
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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. and its companion cases.
During this period of uncertainty, Secretary Perkins found it difficult
to recruit people whom she most wanted to accept positions at the
126
Board, and the agency’s powerlessness diminished its support from
127
its erstwhile allies.
During its period of political impotence the agency had to deal
with the unanticipated conflict between the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) and the American Federation of Labor (AFL).
The response of the Board and its most earnest supporters was, in
essence, to beg both the unions and the regional staffs not to bring
any cases that required the Board to choose between AFL and CIO
128
unions. (A most colorful internal comment from a member of the
Board’s regional staff was that when the issue arises “about the only
thing that you can do . . . is to, when you see them both coming, turn
around and run till you hit a stone wall, and then turn around and

124. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
125. NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937);
Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 146–47 (1937).
126. Perkins, who was working with her Solicitor of Labor Charles Wyzanski on
appointments, had asked Thurman Arnold, William O. Douglas, George Stocking, Charles
Clark, and several others before settling on the candidates eventually appointed to the Board.
RG174, Perkins, NLRB, boxes 84–85 (Letter from Charles E. Clark to Frances Perkins (Aug. 6,
1935); Letter from Thurman Arnold to Frances Perkins (Aug. 13, 1935); Memorandum to the
President (Aug. 14, 1935); Telegram from Frances Perkins to Joseph Chamberlain). Clark, dean
of Yale University School of Law, turned her down in part because “work under the act cannot
be very interesting and effective until its validity has been sustained in part at least.” RG174,
Perkins, NLRB, Box 84 (Letter from Charles E. Clark to Frances Perkins (Aug. 9, 1935)).
127. For example, in a remarkable memorandum from Board attorney Benedict Wolf to the
Board, reviewing the agency’s first year, Wolf remarks that:
The Board has lost some prestige, both with the public, and with the major figures of
the Administration. It has no real power with the Congress or the President. I believe
this result was inevitable, for the Board has functioned for a year without real power,
without public support (except from labor, which hoped to gain by its actions, and
which has inevitably disappointed, with a resultant loss of prestige even here), and
without support from the leaders of the Administration.
RG25, NLRB, Group 1, Former Chairmen’s Files, Program Correspondence Files, Box 2,
unmarked folder (Memorandum from Benedict Wolf, Board Attorney, to the Board (Apr.
1936)).
128. See, e.g., RG25, Former Chairmen, Box 1 Unmarked Files (Letter from Lloyd Garrison
to Joseph Warren Madden, Chairman, NLRB (Jan. 18, 1936)) (advice from Lloyd Garrison);
RG174, Perkins, NLRB Box 85 (Memorandum from J.R. Steelman to the Secretary, CraftIndustrial union case before NLRB (Feb. 28, 1936)) (discussion within Perkins’s office that the
Board had been advised that getting involved in AFL vs. CIO cases “would mean axiomatic
suicide for the Board”).
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129

giggle.” ) Largely spurred by the dissatisfied AFL, strongly antiNLRB congressional hearings (with strong anticommunism fueling
130
the flame) started to take shape in mid-1937, tying the Board’s
hands (and retaliating against it for liberal decisions like upholding
sit-down strikes) and effectively stripping it of its one source of laboreconomics expertise—expertise that, quite frankly, the Board saw no
use for given its quasi-judicial and anti-policymaking vision of its
131
mission.
From the very beginning, the NLRB understood that to be quasijudicial meant to be purely reactive, and therefore to be apologetic
about any accusation of having adopted “ruling[s] or regulation[s]
132
implementing the statute in a substantive way.” As of mid-1940, the

129. RG25, NLRB, Former Chairmen’s Files, Program Correspondence, Box 1: Madden
1937, Regional Conference (Wednesday Morning Session (Oct. 27, 1937)).
130. For the hearings and their impact, see generally GROSS, RESHAPING, supra note 120, at
85–108.
131. From the very beginnings of the “first” National Labor Relations Board, the
Department of Labor warned the NLRB against any policymaking outside the context of
adjudicated cases. When Edwin Smith, later a member of the first post–Wagner Act Board,
excitedly wrote Perkins suggesting that “it would be desirable for the Board to start its work
with some sort of statement of principles. . . . to let the public know at the start certain
predispositions which the Board has,” his idea was struck down by the Department of Labor
with the message “it would be bad policy for the Board to say what it is going to do in advance.”
RG174, Frances Perkins, NLRB, Chron boxes 84–85 (Letter from Edwin S. Smith to Frances
Perkins (July 3, 1934)). Perkins’s highest compliment to NLRB Chairman Madden was that he
had such a “judicially-minded tribunal.” RG25, Former Chairmen, 1935, Biddle, Box 1 (Letter
from Frances Perkins to Joseph Warren Madden (Nov. 8, 1935)). Her office’s memorandum for
the President’s use in his first conversation with new members of the Board put forward that
“[t]he work of the Board will be to decide specific cases and to refrain from research work,” and
that it “should discourage theoretical discussions.” RG174, Frances Perkins, NLRB, Box 84
(Memorandum for the President’s use in conversation with new members of the National Labor
Relations Board (Aug. 1, 1935)). This position echoed think tank advice from the Twentieth
Century Fund’s Special Committee on the Government and Labor, which called for a “quasijudicial” labor tribunal that “should not be a policy making body but should confine itself to
administering policy as defined in the laws.” Saposs, 8–14, 1935 (Findings and
Recommendations of the Special Committee of the Government and Labor of the Twentieth
Century Fund, Inc. 4 (Mar. 4, 1935)). The irony here is that David Saposs worked on that
Committee, and the quasi-judicial approach empowered the lawyers against the economists at
the Board in ways that diminished his influence once he was appointed the Board’s chief
economist. Saposs reported that NLRB Chairman Madden hired him but had no idea of what
his role would be, and that the lawyers on the Board had no respect for his office or the value of
economic training, especially when it came to studies aimed at guiding the Board in its
formulation of policy (as opposed to the development of a factual record on the impact of
particular businesses on interstate commerce). GROSS, MAKING, supra note 120, at 173–76.
132. RG25, NLRB, Group 1, Former Chairmen’s Files, Program Correspondence Files, Box
2 unmarked folder (Conference Memorandum, H.A.M. and Mr. Knapp on Chairman’s
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agency would admit to only one such instance: its decision that
employer refusal to sign a written agreement at the close of successful
collective bargaining was an unfair labor practice, which was said to
133
“occup[y] almost a unique position.” The Board also concluded that
it would be inappropriate to share economic and historical analyses
produced by the Board’s Division of Economic Research with its
adjudicative staff, viewing that information as “one sided,” “biased,”
134
and likely to impair fact-finder objectivity. The NLRB was never
involved in looking into conditions in industries that unions were not
trying to organize; there was no systematic policy at all about the
white-collar workforce, for example, despite chief NLRB economist
135
David Saposs’s expertise in the white-collar middle classes. The
NLRB was, of course, very concerned about company unions as a
matter of policy, but was not involved in challenging them unless
“real” unions came along trying to organize companies with company
unions. The principle of exclusive representation was also absolutely
central as a matter of policy—NLRB insiders saw exclusive
representation as a major difference between the NLRA and the
National Industrial Recovery Act. Yet as Charles Morris has
explained, it was the unions themselves rather than the Board that
turned member-only recognition into full scale exclusivity, and the
unions did so without recourse to NLRB appropriate bargaining unit
136
determinations and Board elections. The Board left important
industries (including much of retail) to state regulation for fear of
asserting defensible but controversial claims of power under the
Commerce Clause.
Once World War II started, the War Labor Board became far
more influential in establishing forward-looking collective bargaining

Statement on S. 675, S. 674, S. 918, at Page 3, 8th line (Apr. 20, 1941) (transcript of
conversations between Chairman Millis and his advisors in advance of congressional testimony).
133. Id.
134. National Archives, Smith Committee Files, General Counsel Files, Box 2, Blankenhorn
(Memoranda of the Board from S.M. Wasserstrom to John Fahy, General Counsel 6 (Nov. 18,
1939)) (reviewing propriety of practices previously identified as potentially problematic for
Smith Committee oversight).
135. For discussion of the NLRB’s early attitudes toward white-collar unionization, see
generally Deborah C. Malamud, Letting in the Company: The National Labor Relations Board
and the White-Collar Worker in the New Deal (Nov. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
136. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 81–88 (2005).
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policy than the NLRB had ever been. By the time the NLRB
emerged from wartime and started to respond to the massive labor
unrest caused by the lifting of wartime no-strike pledges, Congress
had already begun the rampage against labor unions that resulted in
the Taft-Hartley Act. As Professor James Brudney has argued, it was
not until the 1960s that the Board briefly found its policymaking voice
138
and used it persuasively in Supreme Court review.
B. Independence as Isolation
Other limitations on the Board’s policymaking are its lack of
complete jurisdiction over labor relations and its lack of access to the
labor policymaking resources of the Department of Labor. Because
of the fragmented nature of the many state and federal laws
governing work, no single agency is able to regulate the totality of
working conditions. The NLRB is unable to coordinate its
decisionmaking with the data-gathering, policy analysis, and
regulatory initiatives undertaken by the Department of Labor, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or the many state
agencies that regulate the workplace.
When Congress decided in Taft-Hartley to make collective
bargaining agreements enforceable in federal courts, rather than
committing their enforcement and interpretation to the NLRB, it
decided that the NLRB was precisely the wrong venue to decide the
fate of ongoing collective bargaining agreements. The law of
collective bargaining itself was made as much by the courts in cases
arising under section 301 (which provides jurisdiction to federal
139
courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements) as by the Board
140
in cases under section 8(a)(5) (which imposes a duty to bargain).
Moreover, because arbitration is at the core of the process of defining
the nature and scope of the collective bargaining relationship, and the
Board adheres to a policy of deferring to arbitration when the same
conduct possibly constitutes an unfair labor practice and a violation of
a collective bargaining agreement, the Board has voluntarily ceded its

137. JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME STATE: LABOR RELATIONS AND LAW
DURING WORLD WAR II 59 (1998). This was the case especially when it came to key organized
war industries.
138. Brudney, supra note 11, at 241.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
140. Id. § 158(a)(5).
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power to regulate ongoing bargaining relationships. In addition,
when the Supreme Court decided that the power of federal courts to
enforce collective bargaining agreements included the power to
142
enjoin strikes in violation of collective bargaining agreements, and
when Congress created a private right of action with tort damages for
143
violation of the secondary boycott provisions of Taft-Hartley,
federal courts became deeply involved in the regulation of labor
management relations without preliminary involvement of the NLRB
at many phases of the relationship. Secondary boycott suits occur at
the organizing stage, whereas suits seeking damages or an injunction
against violation of a no-strike clause occur once a bargaining
relationship has been established. Moreover, district courts also
adjudicate duty of fair representation cases without NLRB
144
involvement. To a significant extent, then, the Board stands at a
distance from the everyday world of established bargaining
relationships.
Although Frances Perkins failed to place the NLRB within the
Department of Labor, she was heavily involved in monitoring (and
often meddling in) NLRB affairs, and it was her intention that the
Department of Labor provide economic and other social science data
145
to the NLRB. But in practice, the status of the NLRB as an

141. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 N.R.L.B. 573, 573–74 (1984) (deferring to arbitration even
when the arbitration only considered a parallel contract issue); United Techs. Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557, 560–61 (1984) (refusing to entertain an unfair labor practice charge alleging
discrimination against section 7 activity unless and until the union takes the complaint through
the grievance process); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 839, 843 (1971) (dismissing an
unfair labor practice charge alleging a breach of duty to bargain when the same conduct could
be arbitrated, but retaining jurisdiction to hear future motions based on the outcome of the
grievance process); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955) (dismissing an unfair
labor practice charge when it covered the same facts as a previous arbitration). The extent to
which the NLRB will defer to the grievance process was an issue on which the Board changed
rules with changes of the party holding the majority of the seats on the Board. See Gen. Am.
Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 808 (1977) (undermining Collyer, and itself later undermined
by United Technologies). Republican Boards dismissed unfair labor practice charges in more
cases than Democratic Boards did. As shown by the two 1984 decisions cited above, the rules
have remained relatively constant since the Reagan Board.
142. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 237–38 (1970)
(holding that a district court can enjoin a strike in violation of a no-strike clause in a collective
bargaining agreement with a mandatory arbitration clause).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (2006).
144. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 188 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192, 207 (1944).
145. Perkins’s stated reason for wanting to keep the NLRB out of the business of research
was that she did not want it duplicating or interfering with the Department of Labor’s already-
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independent agency outside the Department of Labor has meant that
the two administrative bodies have little to do with each other. The
Department of Labor has the expertise and facilities to produce highquality empirical analyses of the myriad questions that arise in NLRB
cases, but it lacks the jurisdiction to intervene (formally or
informally) in NLRB debates. The NLRB has the jurisdiction, but, as
already noted, Congress denied it the authority and the resources to
engage in independent empirical analyses (as a result of which the
Board lacks the internal expertise to evaluate empirical analyses
offered by interested parties).
The Board’s limited jurisdiction is often problematic in labor
issues involving immigrant workers. Some of the most dynamic union
organizing occurs among workforces with a significant percentage of
146
immigrant workers, and some of those workers are undocumented.
Although the law has been settled for some time that undocumented
147
workers are statutory employees covered by the NLRA, in the
nitty-gritty of NLRB enforcement, there remains considerable
controversy about whether the immigration status of workers can be
brought up in the enforcement proceedings and about remedies for
undocumented workers who have been proven to be victims of unfair
labor practices. When the issue reached the Supreme Court in
148
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB in 2002 and the NLRB
149
took the position (both in its own ruling and its briefing on
150
appeal ) that effective enforcement of labor policy required that
undocumented workers receive the same statutory protections and
the same remedies as all other workers, the Supreme Court refused to

existing research apparatus. She opposed NLRB mediation and conciliation for the same
reason. Indeed, Congress made clear that the NLRB could not engage in mediation and
conciliation in the same amendment that closed down the Board’s economic research division.
146. For an extensive discussion of a labor campaign involving immigrants, see generally
Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond: A New Form of
Unionism in the Twenty-First Century?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF
REPRESENTATION 22 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed., 2004); Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice
for Janitors in Los Angeles: Lessons from Three Rounds of Negotiations, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL.
543 (2002); Catherine L. Fisk et al., Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in Southern
California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE
FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 199 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000).
147. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
148. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
149. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998).
150. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 14–15, Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
Inc., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595).
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give deference to the agency. The lawyer for the Solicitor General’s
office who argued the case was unable to even complete the
traditional opening “May it please the Court,” before Justice Scalia
interrupted him to question whether the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (as the agency within the Justice Department
responsible for immigration enforcement was then known) had
152
approved the government’s position in the case. The majority
opinion explicitly held that the NLRB’s interpretation of the remedial
structure of the NLRA was entitled to no deference because it rested
on a statute outside the NLRB’s authority and competence to
153
administer. This example may be atypical, but it illustrates the
potential difficulty the Board faces in formulating labor policy in the
complex patchwork of other federal statutes that it does not
administer. Although a Justice Department lawyer (not, as is usually
the case, a lawyer from the appellate staff of the NLRB) tried to
persuade the Supreme Court to accept the Board’s interpretation of
the intersection of labor and immigration statutory policy as one that
the Justice Department had approved, the isolation of the NLRB
from the rest of the federal labor and immigration framework
provided a reason for the Court to accord no deference to the
government’s interpretation of the statute.
Only part of the Board’s isolation is a problem of its own
154
making. The decline in the Board’s influence is partly attributable
to the decline in union density brought about by deindustrialization.
Very few industries that were not unionized before the Taft-Hartley
Act have since become unionized. And the industries that were
heavily unionized before Taft-Hartley—mining; metal production;
heavy manufacturing including automobile production; and meat
slaughtering and processing—are almost all in decline. As the labor
force has changed due to a massive influx of immigrants from Latin
America and around the world, industries that were once heavily
unionized suffered huge losses in union density as employers
throughout the unionized regions of the northeast and Midwest
151. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 151–52.
152. Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW
STORIES, supra note 14, at 399, 426.
153. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 149.
154. Admittedly, we have not exhausted all of the problems of the Board’s making that
increase its isolation. For discussion of the Board’s nonacquiescence to circuit courts, see
Brudney, supra note 11, at 237–40.

FISK MALAMUD IN FINAL NEW.DOC

2009]

6/24/2009 8:51:31 AM

NLRB IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW EXILE

2053

closed plants and moved operations to new facilities staffed with
nonunion labor. This has been exacerbated by the woeful failure of
unions to make any effort to organize huge sectors of the economy
for decades and to respond proactively to globalization in
manufacturing and basic industry. Unions delayed too long in finding
strategies to overcome racial division (indeed, many promoted racial
division), which made unions all but irrelevant to labor conditions in
the South. Unions failed to prioritize organizing over the
administration of existing collective bargaining relationships.
As a result of all this, the NLRB is independent, but it also is illinformed and without influence in the shaping of national labor
policy. This is a real shame. The NLRB’s independence and lack of
empirical data collection and analysis have contributed to the
widespread sense that the Board has failed to adapt labor law to the
changing economy. The qualities that make the NLRB seem most
like a specialized labor court and least like a modern administrative
agency—its reactiveness, its lack of reliance on data, and its practice
of deciding all issues based on adjudication of individual cases—have
contributed toward its seeming inability to be proactive in responding
to massive changes in the economy and labor relations over the
course of seventy-five years. Whatever mix of legal rules and
economic and social changes that made collective bargaining a more
peripheral aspect of the labor market than it was in the 1930s, the
result is that the Board has never shaken off the shackles of its
earliest years: it remains reactive rather than proactive in dealing with
social and economic change.
C. Choice of Appointees as a Limit on the Board’s Scope of
Experience
Drawing from data compiled by Professor Joan Flynn, it is clear
that Board appointees now come from established management and
labor legal practice. On both sides of the aisle, mainstream labor
practice is tilted toward the management of ongoing collective
155
bargaining relations. This portion of the labor bar has far less

155. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 246; Flynn, supra note 23, at 1365. This characterization
includes both lawyers in private practice and labor arbitrators/mediators (the background of
both of the Members on the two-member Board—which is perhaps a reason that they are
succeeding in getting so much done). For the backgrounds of Peter C. Schaumber and Wilma B.
Liebman, see National Labor Relations Board, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/board/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009). The exception is appointments drawn from the portion of the
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experience with the currently unorganized sectors of the economy,
the kinds of workers found in them—in particular, immigrants—and
the kind of organizing drives most successful in reaching them. This
means a significant lack of expertise exists in precisely the areas most
likely to be at the cutting edge of Board practice. That expertise is
most likely to be found among federal and state labor officials with
responsibility for issues facing unorganized low-wage workers: wage
and hour and wage-payment violations, health and safety violations,
and so forth. Candidates with this kind of expertise rarely appear on
156
NLRB nominating “wish lists.” Indeed, the question of how to
organize previously excluded groups of workers is one of the issues
that caused the exceedingly counterproductive split between the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) and Change to Win (which is itself
157
splintering as we write).
Another way appointments to the Board limit the Board’s
expertise is that, unlike previously, Board appointees are uniformly
lawyers. Other sources of labor relations expertise, and other sources
of questions and insights that could be brought to Board adjudication,
158
are needlessly locked out of the Board’s decisionmaking process.
D. Rights-Balancing versus Regulation
In keeping with the Clayton Act’s key declaration that “labor is
159
not a commodity,” federal labor law has taken the form of a rights
regime. This way of thinking has great appeal if the goal is
legitimizing protection for labor. Analogizing labor rights to
fundamental civil rights like freedom of speech or freedom from
racial discrimination is a useful rhetorical and organizing strategy in
the face of the familiar charges that labor unions are communistic,
management-side bar that specializes in short-term client relationships and union-avoidance
techniques. Brudney, supra note 11, at 248.
156. See Flynn, supra note 23, at 1419–38 (describing the nominations to the NLRB).
157. For a basic summary of the relationship between the two federations, see After Bitter
Split, Unions Try to Heal Deep Wounds, ABC NEWS, Feb. 28, 2009, http://i.abcnews.com/
Business/Economy/wireStory?id=6979425.
158. As Professor Joan Flynn rightly points out, labor law expertise does little good—at
least when it comes to appointing a Board chairman—if it is not joined with a modicum of
political judgment. See Joan Flynn, “Expertness for What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and
the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 470 (2000).
159. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, once described by a labor leader as labor’s Magna Carta,
says that “the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.” Clayton Act,
ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)).
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corrupt, or undemocratic. But the tendency of lawyers to think of the
protection of labor rights in this way has had the consequence of
making some of the agenda of modern regulatory policy irrelevant to
Board deliberations.
In particular, unlike in the areas of environmental protection,
product safety, or even workplace safety, where there is explicit
discussion of what level of protection is technically feasible and at
what cost, there has not been either a legislative or agency effort to
quantify the effects of labor law on the constituencies of labor policy
(or indeed to identify those constituencies). In any other regulatory
area, one would be likely to see agency-generated (or OIRAdemanded) studies of this nature. Such studies need not be limited to
hard numbers and economic concepts; they could include surveybased or ethnographic efforts to document the dignitary value of
union membership to the majority of union members who do not hold
leadership positions. Regulatory policy has a vocabulary (if a
contentious one) for comparing incommensurables. Indeed, any other
regulatory area is likely to have something resembling a definition of
agency success. What would that be in labor law? Is it the prevention
of strikes? No. The right to strike against unfair labor practices is
fundamental (if massively underprotected), and economic strikes are
an ordinary part of the bargaining process. Is it to generate the
optimal number of strikes? No, because the agency has no way to
make such judgments. Is it the job of the NLRB to diminish labor
unrest? Does it matter if the Board does so by refusing protection to
protesting workers or by granting them protection? Without a
benchmark (other than speed of case processing), how does one know
how the NLRB is doing?
The conceptualization of labor protection as a rights regime
more than a regulatory problem has had other consequences as well.
The Board’s and reviewing courts’ practice of speaking about “rights”
under the NLRA applies not only to workers’ rights to join or refrain
from joining unions and concerted activity, it also—particularly
recently—has become a common way of referring to how the statute
protects employers. Thus, in Register-Guard, the Board reasoned that
an employer’s property right in an email system entitles it to prohibit
160
use of email for union-related communication. In Lechmere, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the property rights of the owner of a

160. Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007).
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shopping mall entitled it to allow access to the public generally but to
161
prohibit access to those seeking to form a union. More recently in
162
Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, the Supreme Court characterized
section 8(c) of the NLRA as granting a right to supplement “the First
Amendment right of employers to engage in noncoercive speech
163
about unionization” and held that this right preempts state laws that
would restrict the use of state funds to support or defeat union
organizing drives. A more regulatory approach to envisioning
employer participation in election campaigns would be amenable to
reshaping by data. For example, in a regulatory regime, it would
matter if evidence showed that employer participation—even when it
falls short of coerciveness and therefore of illegality under current
standards—does more harm than good in fostering rational and
informed decisionmaking by members of the bargaining unit. In a
164
rights regime, that question is irrelevant.
Another example of a regulatory approach the Board could take
concerns the possibility of coercion stemming from both
authorization card campaigns and employer election campaigns. The
Board’s approach to issues is atomistic instead of holistic—it
underutilizes the potential for creating synergies between discrete
areas of doctrine. For example, in Dana, the Board could have
combined its forty-five-day waiting period after voluntary recognition
with a policy of seeking immediate injunctive relief for any employer
unfair labor practice committed during that period and a renewed
commitment to prohibiting misleading or coercive statements during
the organizing process. Such a policy might have presented a
workable compromise. A holistic approach to doctrine and remedies
would have allowed the majority to implement a policy favoring
NLRB-conducted elections without completely ignoring the evidence
161. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 530 (1992).
162. Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
163. Id. at 2413.
164. Professor Brudney suggests that the lack of a regulatory framework for the NLRB
stems from the fact that the agency does not see itself as having a mandate to protect “the public
interest,” but instead “the NLRB’s role appears more akin to that of a traffic cop, monitoring
interactions between two identified constituencies.” Brudney, supra note 11, at 257. At the very
least, the Board has three constituencies: unions, management, and employees, some of whom
wish to be organized and others of whom do not. One might also argue that the Board is
accountable to the “public interest” more generally: to the interest of the public in labor peace,
in the steady flow of goods, in being able to obtain goods produced under publicly acceptable
labor standards, in supporting labor standards above the minimum wage, etc. Nothing the Board
does or says suggests that it views the public interest as a proper object of concern in this sense.
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and argument presented by unions and labor scholars showing that
employer misconduct causes too much of the negative effect of
employer involvement (coercion) and too little of the positive effect
(better information). The Board could have diminished coercion by
using section 10(j) injunctions. At the same time, the Board could
have abandoned the controversial rule adopted by the Reagan Board,
which removed the Board from involvement in policing misleading
statements during election campaigns. (The Reagan Board rule ended
a period in which Democratic- and Republican-dominated Boards
had frequently changed the rule as to whether the Board would set
aside a representation election on the grounds that the employer or
165
the union had made misrepresentations during the campaign. ) In
the context of voluntary recognitions under Dana, the NLRB could
require unions and employers to disclose certain kinds of objective
information to the members of the proposed bargaining unit. In other
words, the agency could both adopt a policy in favor of secret ballot
elections and do something to counteract their potential for coercion.
This would be preferable to just flip-flopping from one administration
to the next.
There is nothing in the Board’s structure or processes to prevent
it from pursuing such a holistic approach to doctrines and remedies
that are presently entirely discrete. Despite these opportunities, the
Board continues to operate like a court, limiting itself to the specific
issues brought to it by the General Counsel, failing to bring multiple
areas of Board doctrine together to enrich its understanding and
amplify its remedial capacities, and, most of all, using rights rhetoric
as a way to mask what would otherwise be its obligation to seek out
(let alone generate) empirical assessments of the effects of its policies.
IV. CASE STUDIES OF THE QUALITY OF THE BOARD’S REASONING
The structural and habitual problems with NLRB policymaking
described above have manifested themselves particularly acutely
since 2001. Given the very broad range of policies that may be said to
be within range of the Board’s mandate because of the conflicting
goals of the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act, an uncontroversial
measure of the Bush II Board’s policymaking is not easy to define. It
is not our purpose here to demonstrate that the Bush II Board’s

165. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 130 (1982) (explaining the historical
changes to the rule).
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changes in the law were more radical or less faithful to the statute
than Clinton Board changes were or Bush I Board changes before
that. Our point is that argument along those lines will necessarily turn
on the values of the person doing the analysis. What we can do, and
what we try to do here, is to illuminate the style of reasoning that the
Bush II and Clinton Boards used to change policy. One measure of
the Board’s success as policymaker is whether its methods and
choices are perceived as legitimate by all of the major stakeholders
within its jurisdiction. By this measure, the Bush II Board did not
succeed. Nor, for that matter, did the Clinton Board succeed in many
166
areas.
In this section, we closely examine the reasoning of several
decisions making a few significant policy changes. Some of the
decisions are from the Bush II Board and some are from the Clinton
Board. We compare the style of reasoning of the two Boards with
respect to two types of decisions. In the first comparison, we look at
how the Board, under two different majorities, analyzed the role of
the Board’s election processes and voluntary decisions about
recognition or withdrawal of recognition of unions. In the second
comparison, we look at some examples of how the Board explains a
decision to adapt old rules to new or changed circumstances. We
chose the issue of voluntary recognition because of its overwhelming
importance in modern organizing and its great political salience in
light of the debate over the Employee Free Choice Act. We chose
cases involving significant changes of policy in order to see how the
167
two Boards dealt with controversial policy change.
We examined the Board’s decisions in the terms in which lawyers
and judges often evaluate the persuasiveness and legitimacy of their
own work: do the opinions candidly acknowledge the difficulty of
difficult issues? Do they address the countervailing arguments? When
making factual assertions or assumptions, do the opinions consider
whether they have a basis in fact? Does the reasoning attempt to
persuade a skeptic, or is a new rule announced as ipse dixit? In the
166. See Flynn, supra note 158, at 502–03 (explaining the NLRB meddling in
“appropriations tug-of-war” as an example).
167. For a general effort to operationalize the administrative law goals of consistency and
rationality, see, for example, Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
HARV. L. REV. 393, 396 (1981); Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 995, 997 (2005). We realize that we are only scratching the surface of the subtlety with
which these issues have been addressed in scholarship that is more general and theoretical than
our own.
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context of either a policy adopted to deal with a new circumstance or
a policy change in an existing area, a persuasive decision is one that is
tied closely to uncontroverted facts and that is premised on logical
reasoning from clearly articulated values that would garner respect or
consensus—values that were clearly in the statute or that would be
shared by the relevant community. As we will explain, part of the
challenge confronting the Board is that the relevant facts are often
hotly contested and it is difficult to find a set of values that enjoy
unqualified statutory support. But even given these limitations, the
Board’s reasoning during the Bush II Administration has left much to
168
be desired.
168. We chose this qualitative method of analysis of a sample of cases in part because largescale quantitative or qualitative analyses of the success or impact of the Board during 2001–2008
are not feasible. There are too many decisions to conduct a systematic qualitative analysis of the
fate of the Bush II Board decisions on judicial review. A quantitative analysis cannot rely on the
Board’s own Annual Report data on its success rate in the courts of appeals because the NLRB
defines “win” as including a win in whole or in part. A partial win could involve a judicial
decision finding the Board to have erred on a significant issue. The NLRB Annual Reports
indicate that the win rate did not change in any perceptible pattern between 2002 (which, given
the time it takes to dispose of a case on appeal, would encompass mainly, if not entirely, Clinton
Board decisions) and 2006 (which would encompass mainly Bush II Board decisions).
We analyzed a subset of fifty significant decisions from the Bush II Board period (2001
to 2007) that overruled precedent. Of those, only eleven had subsequent appellate history. The
following synopses show no clear trend in the decisions:
Three decisions upheld the Board’s rule entirely. Five Star Transp. Inc. v. NLRB, 522
F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2008), aff’g Five Star Transp. Inc., 349 N.R.L.B. 42 (2007) (deferring to the
Board’s application of its rule); Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. NLRB, 515 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir.
2008), aff’g sub nom. Aladdin Gaming, 345 N.L.R.B. 585 (2005) (upholding the Board’s new test
for determining when supervisor interjections into employee conversations are coercive and the
Board’s application of the test to facts); Minn. Licensed Practical Nurses Ass’n v. NLRB, 406
F.3d 1020, 1024–27 (8th Cir. 2005), aff’g sub nom. Alexandria Clinic, 339 N.L.R.B. 1262 (2003)
(upholding the Board’s new rule requiring advance notice if a strike will commence later than
the time originally specified, as well as advance notice if a strike will commence earlier and also
the Board’s decision to apply the new notice rule retroactively to a pending case).
Two cases were remanded for the Board to explain and justify its new rule. In one case,
the Board found that the employer unlawfully installed surveillance cameras but denied
reinstatement and backpay to employees because the cameras revealed that they had engaged
in conduct justifying their discharge. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560, 561 (2004). The
court remanded to the Board to distinguish prior Board precedent which had held that, when an
employer would not have discovered the employee’s behavior without its own illegal conduct,
the Board would order reinstatement. Brewers & Maltsters Local 6 v. NLRB, 414 F.3d 36, 48
(D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’g and remanding sub nom. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 560 (2004).
Upon remand, the Board overruled the prior precedent. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 351 N.L.R.B.
644, 650 (2007). In the other case, the court upheld enforcement of the Board’s order on the
basis of substantial evidence for its factual findings, but remanded the case because the Board’s
order was overbroad. NLRB v. Curwood Inc., 397 F.3d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 2005), enf’g in part,
vacating in part Curwood Inc., 339 NLRB 1137 (2003). The court made clear that, on remand,
the Board could still find that the challenged employer speech was unlawful. Id.
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A. Weighing Elections and Voluntary Recognition: Dana
Corporation and Levitz
One of the most significant features of contemporary union
organizing is the preference many unions exhibit for organizing based
on shows of support occurring outside the NLRB’s election process.
This process is known colloquially as card-check recognition or
voluntary recognition. The basic idea is that the union gathers
employee signatures on cards authorizing the union to represent the
employees for purposes of collective bargaining and then uses
whatever market or political leverage the union can muster to induce
an employer to recognize the union and to commence bargaining.
Under these circumstances, bargaining commences without an NLRB
election and certification of the union as the bargaining
169
representative. The significance of card-check recognition is huge,
to both unions and employers. A number of studies have shown,
using various methods of data gathering and analysis, that the
majority of employers exercise the right currently protected under the
NLRA to conduct extensive campaigns to persuade their employees
170
171
to oppose the union. Many unlawfully fire union supporters. Many
exercise the rights granted by the statute to bar union organizers from
the employer’s premises and to make it as difficult as possible for the
Two cases rejected the Board’s application of its rule because it was not supported by
substantial evidence and because it was a misapplication of the Board’s precedent or an
improper interpretation of the statute. UAW v. NLRB, 520 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’g
and remanding sub nom. Stanadyne Auto. Corp., 345 N.R.L.B. 85 (2005) (upholding the
Board’s application of the rules regulating employer speech on two issues but reversing on a
third issue); Jochims v. NLRB, 480 F.3d 1161, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’g sub nom. Wilshire at
Lakewood, 345 N.L.R.B. 1050 (2005) (holding that the Board’s decision to treat an employee as
a supervisor was not based on substantial evidence, but rather on a misapplication of Board
precedent).
Some cases apparently settled while the appeal was pending or have not been decided.
169. For a brief but insightful summary of the card-check process, see JULIUS G. GETMAN
ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 131 (1976).
170. A recent empirical study that also contains a literature review of past studies is
Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections vs. Card Check Campaigns: Results of a
Worker Survey, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157, 159–61 (2009).
171. GETMAN ET AL., supra note 169, at 14; Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravuich, It
Takes More Than House Calls: Organizing to Win with a Comprehensive Union-Building
Strategy, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 19, 28 (Kate
Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998); Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance:
Understanding the Decline of Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 527 (2001);
cf. John J. Lawler & Robin West, The Impact of Union-Avoidance Strategy in Representation
Elections, 24 INDUS. REL. 406, 409 (1985) (discussing, amidst other employer resistance efforts,
the notion of “discrimination against union supporters”).
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union to communicate with employees about the benefits of
172
unionization. The union argument is, therefore, that card-check
recognition avoids some of the deleterious consequences of the
NLRB election process. Going forward, unions argue that the
Employee Free Choice Act, which would amend the NLRA to
173
facilitate recognition based on a showing of authorization cards is
necessary to counteract the one-sided nature of the two-month-long
174
campaigns running up to NLRB-supervised elections. The employer
argument is that cards do not accurately reflect employee preferences
regarding unionization and that only the NLRB-supervised secret
ballot election, preceded by a campaign in which the employer has
the ability to state its case against unionization, accurately measures
175
employee support for unions. In this highly salient and contested
field, the Bush II Board’s decisions on the circumstances when an
employer may withdraw recognition of a union that became the
bargaining representative through card check as opposed to formal
NLRB certification reflect important policy changes.
Since at least 1966, the Board had adhered to a policy known as
176
the recognition bar. Under that rule, when an employer recognizes
a union based on a showing of authorization cards signed by a
majority of employees, the Board will decline to entertain a petition
177
to decertify the union until a reasonable time has elapsed. The
purpose of the recognition bar doctrine is to protect a newly formed
bargaining relationship from challenge for enough time to enable a
union and an employer to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement. After a reasonable time, if the union fails to negotiate a
contract, the Board will entertain a decertification petition signed by
a minimum of 30 percent of the employees in the bargaining unit. The
Board will then conduct an election to determine whether a majority
of the employees prefer a union. If the parties enter into a collective

172. See Weiler, supra note 69, at 1781 (estimating the odds that a union supporter will be
fired for exercising section 7 rights at 1 in 20).
173. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2008).
174. See, e.g., American Rights at Work Resource Library, http://www.americanrightsat
work.org/employee-free-choice-act/resource-library/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (providing fact
sheets and other resources regarding the Employee Free Choice Act).
175. See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, President & CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Employee Free Choice Act Crushes Workers’ Right to Cast Secret Votes (Aug. 31, 2008),
http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/080831_cardcheck.htm.
176. Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 586 (1966).
177. Id.
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bargaining agreement, then, under the contract bar doctrine, no
decertification or rival union petition can be filed for the term of the
178
contract, not to exceed three years.
In Dana, a majority of the Board overturned the old rule and
held that the employer or employees may file a decertification
petition at any time after voluntary recognition, including after the
employer and union sign a collective bargaining agreement, unless the
employer or union follow newly imposed procedural requirements
179
after voluntary recognition. The requirements are that (1) the
Regional Office must be notified after voluntary recognition, (2) the
Regional Office must send a notice to the employer for posting that
advises employees that the employer had voluntarily recognized the
union, and (3) the employer must post the notice for a period of fortyfive days. If no decertification petition is filed within the forty-five
days after the posting of the notice, then the recognition bar or the
180
contract bar doctrine apply.
The Dana rule rests on a number of factual and policy premises,
none of which are clearly stated or actually defended in the opinion.
It rests on the view that bargaining relationships formed on the basis
of cards should be less insulated from challenges than those formed
on the basis of an election. This in turn rests on a preference for
allowing challenges to the validity of union recognition as opposed to
protecting a nascent union. It also reflects a view that the election
campaign following the filing of the decertification petition is good
because it will enable the employer to make its case against
unionization. The factual premises underlying the majority opinion
are that cards are a less reliable indicator of employee preference
than an election, and that the signatures on a representation petition
do not suffer from the same risk of unreliability as cards do. Both
factual assumptions turn on a further factual premise that coercion
may occur in the context of signing cards that does not occur during
the period running up to an election. And then there is a mixed
factual and policy judgment: that is, that the benefits of an election
outweigh the risks that an employer will decline to cooperate in
bargaining during the forty-five-plus day window and that there will

178. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 53–83 (2d ed. West 2004) (explaining the
procedures for representation cases).
179. Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 434–35 (2007).
180. Id. at 443.
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therefore be no agreement or that an agreement will be invalidated
for failure to comply with the procedural requirements.
Not surprisingly, the dissenting opinion rests on diametrically
181
opposed policy preferences and factual premises.
The policy
preferences and factual premises are more explicitly stated in the
dissent than in the majority opinion. However, it too suffers from a
lack of unchallenged empirical support for its positions. The dissent
would have adopted a policy of protecting new bargaining
relationships and found that decertification election campaigns pose
unacceptable risks of undermining bargaining and of employer
coercion in the decertification election campaign. Moreover, some
readers might find in the dissent an unstated factual premise that an
employer that signs a neutrality and card-check agreement will be
able to effectively break its promise of neutrality by stalling at the
bargaining table while inducing disgruntled employees to file a
decertification petition; such a strategy would allow the employer to
run the anti-union campaign during the decertification election that it
promised not to run during the card-gathering process. The degree to
which these scenarios are real threats is, as with the majority opinion,
an empirical question that would benefit from study.
The two opinions in Dana use the fact that unions with strong
card majorities still lose elections to draw different conclusions. For
the conservatives, election results show that cards are coerced or
based on ignorance, and are not as reliable as votes in NLRBadministered elections. For the liberals, it is just as clear that the cards
represent true preferences and the election results show the adverse
reaction of employees to coercive employer campaigns and actions.
Union advocates have long pointed to polling data on untapped
demand for unionization to support their view that it is employer
coercion rather than peer pressure that explains the difference
182
between cards and election results, but that argument has not
persuaded Boards dominated by Republican appointees. Is the
proper response of a reviewing court, in a hard look review, to
determine the factual correctness of one inference or the other?
181. Id. at 444 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) (citing stable bargaining
relationships and employee free choice as the most important interests).
182. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 69, 83, 97
(1999) (graphing surveys of employee attitudes about work and finding that 63 percent of
workers wanted more influence than they had at work, 56 percent would prefer to raise
problems through an association rather than alone, and 32 percent of unrepresented workers
and 90 percent of union members would vote for union representation if given the chance).
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Probably not—a court would likely say that the agency needs to give
reasons why it chooses one over another and respond to arguments
on both sides. So the test of the validity of the Dana decision, given
the absence of evidence before the Board on whether cards or
election results are more reliable, is simply whether its reasoning
takes the arguments seriously and tries to persuade skeptics.
Imagine a skeptical third party trying to decide between the
majority’s and the dissent’s positions. That person may want to know
how often it is that employees are pressured to sign or not sign an
authorization card or a petition to conduct a decertification election,
and whether that kind of pressure is greater or less than the pressure
that an employee experiences in the run-up to an election. There may
be a factual answer to where the greatest risk of coercion lies, but
neither the majority nor the dissent offers the data. Another way of
thinking about it is this: if corrupt unions use card check and employ
intimidation to get cards, even a dedicated supporter of unions might
worry about card check. The supporter might worry even more if the
facts show that the alternative, a secret ballot election, involves no
risk of employer coercion to induce employees to vote against the
union. On the other hand, if the union using card check is not corrupt
and does not intimidate employees to sign cards, and the employer in
question would intimidate employees to sign a decertification election
petition or would run an extended anti-union campaign, including
firing union supporters, lecturing employees about the harms of
unionization, denying access to employees to talk to the union about
the benefits of unionization, and suggesting that it will eliminate jobs
if the union wins the election, then a neutral third party may be
persuaded that the Board’s policy preference does not strike the right
balance in favor of employee freedom of choice.
A skeptical third party may also want to know whether the
recognition bar insulates ineffective unions from accountability (as
conservatives believe) or protects freely chosen unions from
employers’ bad faith refusals to bargain intended to undermine
support for the union (as union supporters believe). Empirical data
would be illuminating. What accounts for the failure of nearly half of
183
newly certified unions to achieve a first contract? Is it union
183. In 1994, the influential Dunlop Commission (the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations) found that the failure of a newly certified union to secure a first
contract was a serious problem when approximately one-third of new unions failed to secure a
contract within two years of bargaining. In the 2000–2004 period, 44 percent of new unions
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ineptitude and overreaching? Or is it employer anti-union animus and
intransigence?
That neither the majority nor the dissent relied on factual
evidence to support their conclusions is not surprising. Lacking any
social science experts within the agency staff and having no capacity
to conduct studies of actual labor conditions, the Board does not have
access to social science data or other factual research in deciding cases
184
except as the parties choose to provide it in their briefs. In the Dana
case, none of the parties or the many amici cited data in the briefs, at
185
least in the sample of briefs that the NLRB posted on its website.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions cited a law review article
186
that surveyed some of the social science data, but that is no
substitute for rigorous analysis of data.
During the Clinton era, the Board also overturned precedent on
the subject of the balance between elections and voluntary
187
recognition. In Levitz Furniture Co., the Board held that an
employer may withdraw recognition from a union without an election
only if the union has actually lost the support of the majority of the
bargaining unit employees. It also overruled a 1951 Board decision
allowing withdrawal of recognition on the basis of good-faith doubt
188
about the union’s majority status. At the same time, the Board
lowered the threshold for an employer to file a decertification
petition to enable the employer to file upon a showing of “good-faith
reasonable uncertainty” as to the union’s majority status, rather than
189
having to show “disbelief” about the union’s majority status.
The style of reasoning in Levitz differs somewhat from the
reasoning in Dana. In particular, there was a slightly greater effort in

failed to secure a first contract. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
529 (14th ed. 2006); see John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of
Union Organizing Drives, 1999–2004, 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 16 (2008).
184. One empirical study of the extent of employer, union, and coworker pressure in
elections and in card-check campaigns asserts that there is a “gaping hole” in the empirical
literature attempting to compare the degree of pressure in the two organizing scenarios. See
Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 170, at 160.
185. See National Labor Relations Board Frequently Requested Documents, http://www.
nlrb.gov/research/frequently_requested_documents.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2009) (providing
seven briefs of the parties and ten amicus briefs).
186. Dana, 351 N.L.R.B. at 442 n.34 (majority opinion) (citing Brudney, supra note 27); id.
at 445 & n.4 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) (citing Brudney, supra note 27).
187. Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717 (2001).
188. Id. at 717 (overruling Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951)).
189. Id. at 727.
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Levitz to justify the new rule through an appeal to the Board’s
expertise as opposed to through the superiority of the new rule as a
matter of policy. The type of expertise that the Board offered,
however, is quite different from what generally counts as
administrative agency expertise. Through an extended discussion of
the development and operation of the rules, a discussion based on the
Board’s experience as practicing lawyers rather than social science
data, the Levitz Board attempted to situate its policymaking in the
context of the only kind of expertise it possesses—the logical
coherence of doctrine and an intuitive sense about whether particular
190
rules generate productive or unproductive litigation.
Both Dana and Levitz overturned longstanding Board
precedent. Because the quality of Board reasoning in overturning
precedent matters in how it is perceived as an administrative agency,
it is useful to compare how the two opinions handled the task. The
Dana opinion did not attempt to justify the departure from precedent
apart from the previous portions of the opinion that justified the rule
as policy. All it said about precedent was: “Even in the context of
administrative law, the principle of stare decisis is entitled to
considerable weight. ‘The rules governing representation elections
are not, however, fixed and immutable. They have been changed and
191
refined, generally in the direction of higher standards.’” In Levitz,
the majority offered a more extensive explanation of why stare decisis
should give way: the old rule failed to serve statutory policy and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Allentown Mack pointed out the
confusion of the existing law and added to it by changing part of the
192
rule. Several more pages of discussion addressed objections from
the concurring Board member to the new rule and discussed the new
lower standards for employer-initiated (RM) petitions that would
allow an employer to test a union’s majority support more easily to
counteract the possible adverse effects of the new rule making it
harder for the employer to withdraw recognition without an
193
election. But fundamentally, both Dana and Levitz justified the new
rule on the ground that it was superior as a matter of logic and policy,
and not really on the ground that circumstances had changed.
190.
191.
(1966)).
192.
193.

Id. at 720–23.
Dana, 351 N.L.R.B. at 441 (quoting Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240
Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 726.
Id. at 726–28.
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Both Dana and Levitz acknowledge the significance of the rule
change by making the new rules apply only prospectively. The Board
customarily applies a new rule to all cases pending at its adoption, so
the decision to make the rule only apply prospectively signals the
importance of the policy change. Prior Supreme Court case law,
including a short statement in Allentown Mack, makes clear that the
Board is free to decide whether to proceed by rulemaking or
adjudication, assuming those affected by the change receive fair
notice of it, and that giving a decision reached through adjudication
prospective-only application does not render it procedurally
194
inappropriate. Dana reached the decision after giving broad notice
of the issue it was considering and soliciting amicus briefs from the
195
labor community in response. Adjudication is most like notice-andcomment rulemaking when it takes this form. In Levitz, the Board
explained prospective application was desirable to avoid back-pay
liability for employers who had relied on the fifty-year-old Celanese
196
rule in withdrawing recognition and unilaterally lowering wages.
In both Dana and Levitz, the Board’s principal claim to
deference for its policy changes was the strength of its policy and
practical arguments about the desirable balance between the value of
promoting bargaining relationships and the value of having a union
only so long as a majority of employees want it. Just as there was no
data in Dana to support the Board’s decision to lower the bar for
withdrawal of recognition to minimize the risk of coercion of
employees who oppose the union, there was no data in Levitz to
support the decision to increase the bar for withdrawal of recognition
to minimize the risk of coercion of employees who support the union.
The unsupported factual premises play a slightly larger role in Dana
than they do in Levitz, for the heart of the Dana reasoning is that
card-check recognition involves a risk of coercion that the election
197
machinery does not, whereas the heart of the reasoning in Levitz
was an asserted need to simplify and reconcile legal standards in the
198
wake of a significant change imposed by the Supreme Court. But
both decisions would have been significantly more persuasive if they
had included empirical data about the comparative advantages of the
194. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376–77 (1998).
195. Dana, 351 N.L.R.B. at 434 n.2.
196. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 729.
197. Dana, 351 N.L.R.B. at 438.
198. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 723.
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various devices for recognition and withdrawal of recognition of a
union, the costs and benefits of stability of bargaining relationships,
and the degree of manipulation and abuse of legal standards that
occur when employers or unions try to prevent a change in
unionization status against the preferences of the majority of
employees (whatever those preferences may be).
When the Board is balancing statutory goals, it is really engaged
in policymaking rather than in statutory interpretation. There is often
no specific statutory language at issue at all. The majority in Dana
stated in a footnote that “the Board’s irrebuttable presumption of a
union’s continuing majority status following recognition is based on
policy considerations, not on factual probability. Consequently, our
modification of the recognition bar stems from our reassessment of
199
those policy considerations.” Outside the NLRB context, there is no
question that policy judgments are supposed to turn on factual
analysis. Note too that the line between the two does not have to be
as clear because both policymaking and fact-finding via notice-andcomment rulemaking are subject to arbitrary-and-capricious review.
But there is a significant difference between policymaking in a case
like Dana and engaging in rulemaking. The policy would be subject to
judicial review if it were made through rulemaking, but not if it were
made through adjudication. Employees and unions cannot seek
200
review of NLRB representation case decisions.
B. Adapting Old Rules to New Circumstances—Register-Guard and
the Student-Employee Cases
In this section, we consider how both the Bush II Board and the
Clinton Board used changed circumstances to justify the creation of a
new rule. The first example concerns the Board’s controversial and
much-anticipated decision on whether employees have the right to
use workplace email servers to communicate about section 7
activities, including union organizing. The second example is the
series of cases in which the Board decided whether graduate student
teaching assistants and medical residents and interns are employees
entitled to bargain.

199. Dana, 351 N.L.R.B. at 438 n.17.
200. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958) (explaining that such decisions are not
for “review,” but rather to “strike down an order . . . made in excess of [the Board’s] delegated
powers”).
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1. Email and Section 7 Activity. One of the most significant
examples of the Board’s effort to apply old rules to a new
circumstance is its decision in Register-Guard, which held that
employers can prohibit employees from using a company email server
to communicate about union matters even though they allow
employees to use the system to communicate about other nonwork
201
matters. The Board had held earlier that the statute allows
employees to communicate via email about section 7 activity unless
202
the employer flatly prohibits all personal use of email. In RegisterGuard, the Board held that employers can prohibit employees from
using email for solicitations for unions even if they allow the
employees to use email to solicit support for charitable organizations,
for personal correspondence, for invitations to social events, and to
203
buy and sell things and services like sports tickets and pet sitting. In
other words, employers can discriminate against all section 7 related
communication, so long as it does not discriminate in favor or against
204
unions. In response to the argument that email had replaced the
face-to-face communication or distribution of leaflets that the Board
had long found section 7 to protect, the Board said that the “use of email has not changed the pattern of industrial life at the Respondent’s
facility to the extent that the forms of workplace communication
sanctioned in [past cases] have been rendered useless and that

201. Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007).
202. Media Gen. Operations, Inc., 346 N.L.R.B. 74, 76 (2005); E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 919 (1993).
203. Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1116.
204. The Board reasoned as follows: (1) The employer has a property right in its email
system which allows it to regulate employee use of the system. (2) Prior cases have held that the
employer can restrict employees from nonbusiness use of equipment such as telephones,
bulletin boards, or public announcement systems without running afoul of section 8(a)(1), which
prohibits enforcement even of neutral rules that interfere with the exercise of section 7 rights
absent sufficient business justification. (3) Prior cases have held that the employer cannot
prevent employees from communicating with each other in the workplace about union-related
matters, though the employer may prohibit nonwork-related communications during working
time and may prohibit the distribution of literature at any time in working areas because of the
need to control litter. (4) Email is more akin to a telephone, a bulletin board, or a public
announcement system than it is to oral solicitation or distribution of literature. (5) The cases
having to do with section 7 protections for oral solicitation or literature distribution, which
require a balancing between the employees’ section 7 rights to communicate and the employer’s
rights to control the workplace, are inapposite because email communication is not like oral
communication, and the section 7 right to communicate “does not require the most convenient
or most effective means of conducting those communications, nor does it hold that employees
have a statutory right to use an employer’s equipment or devices for Section 7
communications.” Id. at 1115.
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employee use of the Respondent’s email system for section 7
205
purposes must therefore be mandated.” It offered no reasoning for
this conclusion.
The philosophical position reflected in the case was a significant
departure from past practice. For many decades, the NLRB and the
courts read section 7 of the NLRA to give employees rights to
communicate about unions at work, both orally and in writing, so
long as they did so during nonworking time. In past cases, the Board
and the Supreme Court rejected the contention that employers’
ownership of the factory, office, or other work space, or their
contractual right to control employees’ behavior at work, gave them
the right to control what employees said about unions while on the
premises except as necessary to maintain production during working
time and to avoid litter of working areas caused by distribution of
206
literature during nonwork time. But in Register-Guard, the Board
read the employer’s property rights in the email server to trump the
207
employees’ section 7 rights to communicate.
Register-Guard also overturned established Board policy with
respect to whether an employer that allows some forms of nonworkrelated communication can prohibit union-related communication.
The law has long been settled that an employer may not discriminate
against section 7 activity (whether it was pro- or anti-union) in the
enforcement even of legitimate rules, such as those regarding
208
telephones or the distribution of literature. The Board embraced a
new theory for what violates section 8(a)(1): absent evidence that the
employer discriminates among types of section 7 activity, the
employer need not show any legitimate purpose for its rule. The law
had previously been settled that section 8(a)(1) did not require proof
of discrimination; rather, that the employer allowed some forms of
205. Id. at 1116.
206. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797, 803 n.10 (1945).
207. The employee at issue in Register-Guard had not used the employer’s computer to send
certain emails; she had done so from a computer off of the premises. Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at
1112. Nevertheless, the Board found that the employer’s ownership of the email server trumped
the employees’ rights to communicate, even though the Board conceded that it was unlikely that
union messages caused any measurable burden on the server or otherwise harmed the
employer’s property interest in its server in any way. Id. at 1116 n.11.
208. See, e.g., GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 178, at 151 (stating that 8(a)(1) prohibits an
employer from taking “action which, regardless of the absence of antiunion bias, tends to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce a reasonable employee in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7, provided the action lacks a legitimate and substantial justification such as plant
safety, efficiency or discipline”).
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nonwork communications was evidence that the employer had no
legitimate business purpose for its restriction on communication and,
therefore, section 7 rights should trump the employer’s rights to
209
control its workplace or communications devices. The Board
rejected this balancing of interests approach in favor of a theory
210
requiring discrimination to prove a violation of section 8(a)(1).
The opinion discussed no data to address the question whether
there was any legitimate employer need to restrict employee use of
email systems. If one does not accept the majority’s assertion that the
employer’s mere ownership of the email server answers the question
whether section 7 protects the rights of employees to use the server to
communicate about unions or other concerted activities for mutual
aid and protection, there is little else in the opinion that would help
one decide whether section 7 protects the right to communicate via
the employer’s email server. Section 7, like most other labor and
employment statutes, interferes to some degree with what occurs on
the employer’s property. So a skeptic might want some factual basis

209. For example, in Republic Aviation, the Supreme Court held unlawful a company rule
which forbade solicitation of any kind on company property and rejected the defense that the
no-solicitation rule had been adopted before the advent of the union, was not motivated by
antiunion bias, and had been applied nondiscriminatorily against all forms of in-plant
solicitation. 324 U.S. at 805; see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 178, at 151–53 (describing
NLRB and Supreme Court decisions establishing that proof of discriminatory motive is
generally not required in section 8(a)(1) cases).
210. The Board adopted a view articulated by the Seventh Circuit in a couple of cases
declining enforcement of Board orders that only rules treating section 7 conduct differently
from all other similar conduct violate section 8(a)(1). Guard, 324 U.S. at 1117–18. The two
Seventh Circuit decisions were ones that the Board previously had refused to acquiesce in.
Guardian Indus., Corp., 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995), denying enforcement, 313 N.L.R.B. 1275
(1994); Fleming Co. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2003), denying enforcement, 336 N.L.R.B.
192 (2001). The other authority the Board cited for this proposition, aside from two decisions
from the Bush II Board, neither of which was on point, was a 1958 Supreme Court decision,
NLRB v. Steelworkers (Nutone & Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958), which allowed an employer
that prohibits solicitation during working time to violate its own no-solicitation policies by using
work time to give anti-union speeches to employees. In Enloe Med. Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. 991
(2006) and Salmon Run Shopping Center, 348 N.L.R.B. 658 (2006), the Board held that
discriminatory enforcement of a no-solicitation rule violated section 8(a)(1). Enloe Med. Ctr.,
348 N.L.R.B. at 991; Salmon Run, 348 N.L.R.B. at 658 . Neither held that discrimination was
necessary to prove the section 8(a)(1) violation, only that enforcement of a facially valid rule in
a discriminatory manner violates section 8(a)(1). Enloe, 348 N.L.R.B. at 991; Salmon Run, 348
N.L.R.B. at 659–60. The Board in Salmon Run recognized that discrimination in the
enforcement of a facially valid rule is an exception to the general mode of analysis, which is the
Republic Aviation rule that compares the burdens on the employer’s operations against the
benefits of section 7 activity and does not turn on proof of discrimination. Salmon Run, 348
N.L.R.B. at 658.
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for deciding how to balance the employees’ labor rights against the
employer’s property rights.
The absence of evidence about the necessity for or impact of the
rule was not, in this case, the result of a lack of evidence presented to
the agency. The parties had adduced evidence about the costs to firms
of allowing employee use of email for nonwork communication, but
the Board dismissed it as irrelevant. “Testimony in the record that
sending or receiving a simple ‘text’ e-mail does not impose any
additional monetary cost on the Respondent is of no consequence to
our inquiry here. The Respondent’s property rights do not depend on
211
monetary cost.” There was also summary information presented in
at least one amicus brief about the aggregate costs firms spend to
maintain email systems and summaries of some survey data on the
average amount of time employees spend per day or week on email,
on nonwork-related email, and on the number of employers that
monitor employee computer use through keystroke records and lists
212
of websites visited. The opinion cited none of this data, and the
Board’s reasoning made the justifications for the employer’s policy
irrelevant: “An employer has a basic property right to regulate and
restrict employee use of company property. The Respondent’s
communications system, including its email system, is the
Respondent’s property and was purchased by the Respondent for use
213
in operating its business.”
2. Graduate Students, Residents, and Interns. One of the
controversial issues at the Board during the Clinton and Bush II
Administrations was whether medical residents and interns (house
staff) and graduate student teaching assistants were eligible for
protection under the NLRA in their efforts to unionize and bargain
collectively. In some cases decided in the early- and mid-1970s—
shortly after hospitals became subject to NLRB authority by 1974
statutory amendments, and the Board first asserted jurisdiction over
private, nonprofit universities in 1971—the Board held that house
staff and teaching assistants were not eligible for statutory protection

211. Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1116 n.11.
212. Brief for the United States Chamber of Commerce as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 3, Guard Publ’g Co. v. Eugene Newspaper Guild, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/Briefs/Chamber%20of%20Commerce.pdf.
213. Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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214

for collective bargaining. As organizing continued among other job
categories in the health care industry, residents and interns continued
attempts to organize, and in 1999, a case came before the Board that
215
presented the issue anew. In Boston Medical Center Corporation,
the Board overturned its rulings from the 1970s and extended
216
bargaining rights to them. Graduate student teaching assistants,
among whom organizing had spread rapidly in the 1990s, seized upon
217
the Boston Medical Center decision and, in New York University,
the Board held that they too were eligible for statutory protection for
218
219
collective bargaining. Four years later, in Brown University, the
Board overturned New York University and held that graduate
student teaching assistants are not entitled to statutory protection for
220
collective bargaining. This trio of decisions offers an example of the
ways in which the Board goes about its policymaking function.
Boston Medical Center is the longest of the opinions, made the
greatest effort to provide a factual basis for its policy judgments, and
placed the least emphasis on reasoning based on precedent. The
opinion asserted the Board’s policymaking authority through a
detailed description of the job functions of medical residents and
221
interns and their role in a major teaching hospital. It also made
functional arguments based on the experience of the labor market:
the opinion began by pointing out that, until the merger of two
hospitals, the house staff at the hospital had been covered by the
Massachusetts public sector labor law and had been unionized and
bargained collectively since 1969, and then analyzed in detail how the
222
house staff function in the hospital. Toward the end of the opinion,
the Board placed great emphasis on evidence from actual practice in

214. St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000, 1003–04 (1977) (holding that house
staff are employees but are not eligible to bargain); Cedar’s Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251,
251 (1976) (holding that house staff are not employees under the NLRA); Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 621 (1974) (holding that graduate student teaching assistants are
not employees); Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 331 (1971) (asserting jurisdiction over private,
nonprofit universities).
215. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
216. Id. at 152.
217. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
218. Id. at 1205.
219. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
220. Id. at 483.
221. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 153–56.
222. Id. at 156.
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223

hospitals. The Board discussed a variety of state public sector labor
laws allowing residents and interns of public hospitals to bargain, and
continued:
It is plain that collective bargaining by public sector house staff has
been permitted and widely practiced. No party or amicus in the
instant proceeding has pointed to any difficulty arising from this
bargaining. Indeed, the American Medical Association, although
opposed to granting house staff the right to strike under the Act,
224
urges that house staff be accorded bargaining rights.

In some sections, the Board emphasized its role as interpreter of
225
the statutory language. Early in the opinion, the Board discussed
the language of the NLRA, emphasizing the breadth of the statutory
definition of an employee (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any
226
employee” ), and discussed their job functions in light of the
227
dictionary definition of employee. The opinion also examined other
statutory language, including section 2(12)(b), which includes “any
employee who (i) has completed the course of specialized intellectual
instruction and study . . . and (ii) is performing related work under the
supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a
228
professional employee . . . .”
In several sections, the Board turned away from either statutory
language or evidence from actual practice to focus on judicial
reasoning. The opinion examined the legislative history of the
229
healthcare amendments to the NLRA. It pointed out that the
Cedars-Sinai decision, which held house staff not be employees, had
230
drawn a sharp dissent. The sharp dissent within the Board is the
only place to find a careful review of the majority’s decision because,
231
under Leedom v. Kyne, unions have no effective way to gain judicial

223. Id. at 163.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 159.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 159–61.
228. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 2, 61 Stat. 136, 139 (1947) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2006)).
229. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 163.
230. Id.
231. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
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review of unfavorable representation decisions that do not violate
232
express statutory commands—and most do not.
In one short section, the Board presented the argument that
precedent should be overruled on account of changed circumstances,
emphasizing “our experience and understanding of developments in
labor relations in the intervening years since the Board rendered [the]
233
decisions [in Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s Hospital].” But then the
opinion moved on without study of the developments in labor
relations. Instead, the opinion turned to judicial interpretation:
“Almost without exception, every other court, agency, and legal
analyst to have grappled with this issue has concluded that interns,
234
residents, and fellows are, in large measure, employees.” The only
discussion of labor relations in that section was the assertion that the
“overriding purpose of the 1974 Healthcare Amendments was the
elimination of recognition strikes and picketing,” a purpose that
would be served by covering house staff by the Act so that their
235
recognitional efforts would be subject to regulation. Finally, the
Board addressed the arguments that bargaining by house staff would
236
infringe upon the academic freedom of medical schools.
The Board’s decision in New York University extending
bargaining rights to graduate student teaching assistants was much
shorter, and relied largely on the reasoning of Boston Medical
237
Center. It too recited the broad statutory definition of employee,
and briefly pointed out that “graduate assistants perform services
under the control and direction of the Employer, and they are
238
compensated for these services by the Employer.” The opinion then
concentrated on responding to the university’s argument about the
differences between graduate student teaching assistants and house
staff with regard to the amount of time they spend working each day,
the fact that graduate students receive a degree whereas house staff
only receive certification necessary to obtain a full license, and
whether graduate students’ economic relationship with their

232. See id. at 188 (“This suit is not one to ‘review’ in the sense of that term as used in the
Act, a decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction.”).
233. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 163.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 164–65.
237. N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1206–09 (2000).
238. Id. at 1206.
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employer is significantly different from house staffs’ relationship with
239
a hospital. Finally, the opinion dismissed the employer’s arguments
240
about academic freedom.
In overturning the New York University decision, the Bush II
Board in Brown University placed principal emphasis on New York
241
University having overturned precedent.
It described Leland
242
Stanford Junior University as old or “longstanding” precedent over
243
a dozen times. After describing the job functions of graduate
student teaching assistants and the financial support the university
provided to them, the bulk of the Board’s opinion focused on Board
244
cases and on statutory language and purpose. The heart of the
Board’s reasoning is its assertion that “the underlying fundamental
premise of the Act,” is that it is “designed to cover economic
245
relationships” and that the relationship between graduate student
246
teaching assistants and universities is not economic. The reasoning
depends largely on arguments from definition: student-university
relations are educational not economic; bargaining rights regulate an
adversarial process and the student-university relationship is not
adversarial.
The majority rejected the dissent’s contention that “the changing
financial and corporate structure of universities” justified graduate
247
student unions, as the Clinton Board had held. But to do so it
offered no empirical support, and instead simply reiterated its
arguments from definition (for example, the individuals seeking
bargaining rights “are students,” the money the universities pay and
248
the work the students perform depend on their “being a student”).
Finally, as to the evidence that graduate students at many state
239. Id. at 1206–07.
240. Id. at 1208.
241. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004).
242. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
243. See, e.g., Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 483 (“This longstanding approach towards graduate
student assistants changed abruptly with NYU.”); id. at 491 (“Our colleagues’ assertions,
therefore, turn a blind eye to the Board’s longstanding policy.”).
244. See id. at 488–500.
245. Id. at 488.
246. The Board reasoned that the relationship between graduate students and a university
“is primarily educational,” that teaching and research experience “is integral to the education of
the graduate student,” and that the compensation paid for the work “is the financial support
provided to graduate student assistants because they are students.” Id. at 488–89.
247. Id. at 492.
248. Id.
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universities had unionized and bargained without apparent
consequence for education or academic freedom, the majority stated:
“inasmuch as graduate student assistants are not statutory employees
249
that is the end of the inquiry.” Similarly, responding to the dissent’s
argument that the new rule was unsupported by “empirical evidence”
and was “policymaking reserved to Congress,” the majority said
“[o]nce again, inasmuch as graduate student assistants are not
250
statutory employees, that is the end of our inquiry.”
Regardless of one’s views on the outcomes, there is much to
regret in the reasoning of the Board’s decisions in these hotly
contested areas. Arguments from definition rarely persuade skeptics,
especially when the relevant statutory language is as vague and
circular as the statement that an “employee” is defined as
“employee.” Moreover, to the extent that the New York University
decision is based on the assertion that collective bargaining would
251
interfere with graduate education and with academic freedom, those
assertions are empirically testable. The Clinton Board decisions
extending bargaining rights had at least a rhetorical advantage in
being able to point to the record of (apparently) successful bargaining
at public universities and at public sector hospitals to support their
argument. But a skeptic would want better data: what is the effect of
bargaining at hospitals and universities that allow it, and how does
that experience compare to hospitals and universities that do not?
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
As much as Democrats wish it were otherwise, sooner or later
the Republican party will win back the White House and will have the
chance to appoint its own NLRB majority. If past experience is any
guide, that Board will be fully able to sweep away precedents from
the Obama Board, just as the Bush II Board swept away the policies
of the Clinton Board. Is there anything that an Obama Board can or
should do to anticipate yet another swing of the pendulum? In the
nearer term, when the Obama Board goes about reversing the Bush
II Board decisions, are there ways that the Board could make its
decisions more likely to survive appellate review in federal courts
dominated by Bush II judges? If the Obama Board simply says, as

249. Id.
250. Id. at 493.
251. See discussion supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.
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Member Liebman put it in her congressional oversight hearing
testimony in 2007, that the Bush II Board has overvalued individual
anti-union employee freedom at the expense of encouraging
252
collective bargaining, there is no reason to believe that story line
will appeal to the current majority of the federal appellate bench.
Our aim here is not merely to evaluate the Bush II Board’s work,
but also to explore the challenges facing the agency going forward:
are there ways to improve labor law as a field by working from the
perspective of administrative law, rather than the seemingly
impossible quest for an overhaul of the NLRA?
Perhaps.
A. For the Board
(1) Take a more holistic regulatory approach to problem-solving,
using a wider range of synergies between doctrinal and remedial
approaches. This suggestion is directed both to the members of the
Board and to the Board’s General Counsel, whose job it is to screen
cases for litigation and initiate substantive and remedial strategies in
Board litigation.
(2) More clearly identify Board decisions as involving
policymaking—not only as opposed to fact-finding, but as opposed to
law-finding. Impose an internal hard look doctrine when evaluating
the Board’s reasoning, especially in cases inconsistent with previous
precedent or purporting to rest on economic changes. When policy
judgments are ideological, identify and defend them as such.
(3) Work with the Department of Labor to generate data
relevant to the major policy issues facing the Board. When
proceeding by adjudication, expressly solicit amicus briefs from the
relevant social science communities. Examples might include the
question of whether cards are more or less reliable than elections; the
economic effects of treating categories of workers as employees (such
as graduate students and house staff) based on studies on collective
bargaining by those workers under public-sector state labor law.
(4) Develop internal social science expertise notwithstanding the
ban on hiring persons for economic analysis. Be prepared to defend in
courts (should someone successfully assert standing), or (more likely)
252. The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Decisions and Their Impact on Workers’
Rights, supra note 90, at 26 (statement of Wilma B. Liebman, Member, NLRB) (“Virtually
every recent policy choice by the board impedes collective bargaining, creates obstacles to union
representation, or favors employer interests.”).
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in congressional oversight hearings, the position that the Board no
longer construes the ban as broadly barring the internal development
and evaluation of social science evidence.
253
(5) Take advantage of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to
develop a consultative relationship with an interdisciplinary group of
labor scholars, experts in the interpretation of empirical research,
widely respected former governmental officials (including retired
appellate court judges), and experts in fields outside NLRB
jurisdiction but with implications for NLRB policy (for example,
immigration). Use the Advisory Committee as a forum for exchange
on matters of policy that are within the power of the NLRB to
address, as opposed to using it for purposes of generating legislative
proposals unlikely to get off the ground.
(6) Consider alternatives to both rulemaking and adjudication in
the formulation of policy (e.g., nonbinding policy guidance
254
documents), at least at the early stages of policy development.
(7) Consider using rulemaking rather than adjudication in
recurring circumstances in which adjudicatory decisions would be
insulated from judicial review (for example, representation case
decisions that would be unreviewable by unions), or in circumstances
in which the Board has already been harshly criticized by the courts
of appeals for multiple changes in position.
B. For the Executive
(1) Appoint some Board members from unconventional
backgrounds. The early membership of the Board included social
scientists—the members need not all be lawyers. Among lawyer

253. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–15 (2006). A new advisory committee can be established by an
agency head if it is “determined as a matter of formal record, by the head of the agency involved
after consultation with the Director [of the Office of Management and Budget], with timely
notice published in the Federal Register, to be in the public interest in connection with the
performance of duties imposed on that agency by law.” Id. § 9(2). Advisory committees can also
be “specifically authorized by statute or by the President.” Id. § 9(1). The FACA applies to an
“agency” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act section 551(1), which
includes independent agencies. Id. § 3(3).
254. See, e.g., Claire Tuck, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable Alternative to Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1120–21 (2005) (“[T]he Board should
provide some guidance to parties beyond individual adjudications by issuing nonbinding
statements of policy.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2004, at 15, 32 (“Some agencies rely heavily on adjudication, others on
legislative rules, and others on a rich mix of tools. These varying practices invite questions about
how agencies choose among their available options.”).
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appointees, choose some lawyers with Department of Labor
experience or experience in employment sectors that are the object of
nontraditional organizing drives.
(2) For purposes of Executive administrative law reform,
develop a definition of “agency rule” or “agency regulation,” that
includes some or all agency adjudicative orders, and develop
regulatory reform tools that would apply to them.
(3) Consider an across-the-board approach to regulatory reform
of independent agencies. At the very least, use (and publicize)
prompt letters and other existing regulatory reform tools currently
deemed appropriate to independent agencies, to move them toward a
coherent regulatory approach.
(4) Review the work of other adjudicative agencies to look for
models that would improve the NLRB.
(5) Take advantage of the Solicitor General’s involvement in
NLRB Supreme Court litigation to influence the clarity of the
255
agency’s decisionmaking.
C. For Congress
(1) Congressional supporters of collective bargaining should
realize that there is a downside to effectively cutting the Board’s
membership to two members. The result will be a significant backlog
of the Board’s most important, policy-determining decisions, which
will then be reviewed by courts of appeals impatient with delayed and
hastily reasoned Board opinions.
(2) Use oversight hearings and appropriations pressures as an
occasion to request data from the U.S. Government Accountability
256
Office (GAO, previously known as the General Accounting Office)

255. On the thorny question of the relationship between the Solicitor General and
independent agencies, see generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
256. A review of the GAO’s website showed very few congressional requests for
information relevant to substantive NLRA issues. The GAO did provide a study of the NLRB’s
July 8, 1997, Draft Strategic Plan, submitted by the Board pursuant to the Government
Performance Results Act of 1993 (The Results Act). U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NAT’L
LABOR RELATIONS BD., OBSERVATIONS ON THE NLRB’S JULY 8, 1997, DRAFT STRATEGIC
PLAN (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97183t.pdf. The study was
presented to the House of Representatives on July 24, 1997. Oversight of National Labor
Relations Board: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on
Government Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 148–59 (1997) (statement of Carlotta C.
Joyner, Director, Education and Employment Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office). By its
terms, the section of The Results Act requiring agencies to formulate strategic plans applies
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and other reliable sources (for example, the Congressional Research
257
Service) to study questions over which there are significant policy
disputes. Such data could, for example, quantify the costs both of the
Board’s administrative practices (for example, the dollar cost to the
agency of its intracircuit nonacquiescence policy or societal costs of
administrative delay) and the costs and benefits of its substantive
policies.
(3) Consider prioritizing labor law reform legislation (although,
for reasons already described, this call has fallen on deaf ears for
decades).
D. For the Courts of Appeals
(1) Be clearer on the line between law and policy, not just the
line between fact and policy.
(2) When applying administrative law to Board decisions, cite
and use the same modern Supreme Court precedents that are
routinely used in other regulatory fields. Reviewing courts tend to
cite only other NLRB cases, many of them predating important
258
developments in the contemporary law of judicial review. The effect
is for the Board to be isolated from those developments in
administrative law that apply to agency adjudications.
(3) Articulate a version of the arbitrary-and-capricious or hard
look standard for agency policymaking (and the harder look standard
for agency changes in policy) that is well adapted to agency
policymaking-by-adjudication. Some courts of appeals treat State
259
Farm as a deferential standard, whereas others—especially the D.C.
only to executive agencies as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 105. See 5 U.S.C. § 306(f) (2006).
Independent agencies like the NLRB are not executive agencies under this definition, but the
NLRB has participated in the process nonetheless. For further discussion, see The Results Act
section of the GAO website. U.S. GAO, Results-Oriented Decision Making, http://www.gao.
gov/transition_2009/challenges/results_decision_making/home_results_decision_making.php
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
257. According to the Congressional Research Service website, the Service “provides,
exclusively to the United States Congress, objective, nonpartisan assessments of legislative
options for addressing the public policy problems facing the nation,” and has a large,
multidisciplinary staff with subject matter expertise on a wide range of policy fields, including
labor. About the Congressional Research Service, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/aboutcrs.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2009).
258. See, e.g., NLRB v. Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13, 21–36 (1st Cir. 1999) (going
through a full recitation of standards of review for law, fact, and policy, and then proceeding not
to use any of them).
259. See, e.g., Recon Refractory & Constr. Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.3d 980, 987–88 (9th Cir.
2005).
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Circuit—give it more of a hard look standard inflection. The latter
seems more appropriate in the case of policy changes, given the
Board’s ailing reputation.
(4) Use hard look review under the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard (as the doctrine was used in Overton Park) to condition
approval of NLRB policymaking on the development of the kind of
261
record it would possess if it were engaged in rulemaking. In other
words, demand that the Board secure, through party briefs or
independent research, the kinds of economic and other social science
analyses that would better inform its policymaking.
(5) With regard to arbitrary-and-capricious or hard look review,
accept the following caveat: be modest about one’s own
understanding of American workers and their varied workplaces, and
also about one’s knowledge of labor law as a field. The decline in
union density has meant a decline in the number of NLRB cases
reaching the courts of appeals, and most NLRB cases skip the district
courts entirely. This means that newly appointed federal appellate
judges are likely to take a very long time to internalize the values
(conflicting though they may be) underlying the NLRA. Judges
would do well to recognize the difference between poorly reasoned
opinions and opinions that draw upon assumptions and
262
understandings widely shared by those with background in the field.

260. See, e.g., Pearson Educ., Inc. v. NLRB, 373 F.3d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Nathan Katz
Realty, LLC v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Long Island Head Start Child
Dev. Serv. v. NLRB, 460 F.3d 254, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Our ‘hard look’ will also examine
whether an agency decision accurately reflects its own caselaw . . . . [U]nder State Farm, an
agency explanation will not be afforded deference unless the agency has considered all relevant
issues and factors.”); cf. Local 814, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 564, 572 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (objecting to a “remand for supplementation” and calling for
reversal and remand “for a thorough reconsideration of the doctrinal quicksand in this area” in
question).
261. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), a case
involving “informal adjudication,” the Court, dissatisfied with the state of the record underlying
an “informal adjudication,” effectively required the agency to produce a formal record or make
officials available for live testimony—all the while acknowledging that the APA does not
require formal findings in such a case. Id. at 419–20.
262. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 247 (referring to data showing that judges with labor
experience, even management experience, uphold the Board more often than others do).
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E. For the Supreme Court
(1) Follow suggestions one, two, and three for the courts of
263
appeals in Part V.D.
(2) Do a more serious job of applying arbitrary-and-capricious
review to NLRB policymaking. Take Allentown Mack as a case in
264
point.
The NLRB is much maligned for hiding the ball: for hiding its
265
policymaking in adjudicatory fact-finding. Allentown Mack is the
leading Supreme Court case addressing this problem, and it has put
the Board on notice that this practice is no longer acceptable. But at
the same time, Allentown Mack hardly serves as an example of rigor
when it comes to judicial review of Board policymaking as such.
The case involved the Board’s unitary standard for three mechanisms
through which an employer wishes to test the continuing majority
support for an incumbent union: polling, Board decertification
elections, and withdrawals of recognition. This is all the Court had to
say about it:
While the Board’s adoption of a unitary standard . . . is in some
respects a puzzling policy, we do not find it so irrational as to be
“arbitrary [or] capricious” within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Board believes that employer polling is
potentially “disruptive” to established bargaining relationships and
“unsettling” to employees, and so has chosen to limit severely the
circumstances under which it may be conducted. The unitary
standard reflects the Board’s apparent conclusion that polling
should be tolerated only when the employer might otherwise simply
withdraw
recognition
and
refuse
to
bargain.
It is true enough that this makes polling useless as a means of
insulating a contemplated withdrawal of recognition against an
unfair-labor-practice charge—but there is more to life (and even to
business) than escaping unfair-labor-practice findings. An employer
263. With respect to (2), see, for example, NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of
America, 511 U.S. 571 (1994), reversing the Board on an important question of statutory
interpretation, the scope of the term “supervisor,” without citing Chevron. Id. at 576–84. The
Supreme Court often cites a pre-Chevron case, Fall River Dying & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB,
482 U.S. 27 (1987), rather than contemporary sources on the appropriate scope of review of
NLRB decisions. E.g., Health Care, 511 U.S. at 576.
264. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366–67 (1998).
265. See, e.g., Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking
and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995); Michael J. Hayes, After “Hiding
the Ball” is Over: How the NLRB Must Change its Approach to Decision-Making, 33 RUTGERS
L.J. 523 (2002).
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concerned with good employee relations might recognize that
abrupt withdrawal of recognition—even from a union that no longer
has majority support—will certainly antagonize union supporters,
and perhaps even alienate employees who are on the fence.
Preceding that action with a careful, unbiased poll can prevent these
consequences. The “polls are useless” argument falsely assumes,
moreover, that every employer will want to withdraw recognition as
soon as he has enough evidence of lack of union support to defend
against an unfair-labor-practice charge. It seems to us that an
employer whose evidence met the “good-faith reasonable doubt”
standard might nonetheless want to withdraw recognition only if he
had conclusive evidence that the union in fact lacked majority
support, lest he go through the time and expense of an (ultimately
victorious) unfair-labor-practice suit for a benefit that will only last
until the next election. And finally, it is probably the case that,
though the standard for conviction of an unfair labor practice with
regard to polling is identical to the standard with regard to
withdrawal of recognition, the chance that a charge will be filed is
significantly less with regard to the polling, particularly if the union
wins.
It must be acknowledged that the Board’s avowed preference
for . . . elections over polls fits uncomfortably with its unitary
standard; as the Court of Appeals pointed out, that preference
should logically produce a more rigorous standard for polling. But
there are other reasons why the standard for polling ought to be less
rigorous than the standard for Board elections. For one thing, the
consequences of an election are more severe: If the union loses an
employer poll it can still request a Board election, but if the union
loses a formal election it is barred from seeking another for a year. If
it would be rational for the Board to set the polling standard either
higher or lower than the threshold for an . . . election, then surely it
266
is not irrational for the Board to split the difference.

Splitting the difference, without the presentation by the Board of any
internal logic beyond indecision and “apparent” compromise, hardly
stands up to arbitrary-and-capricious review in its hard look aspect.
The Board should not be led to believe that all it needs to do is
identify its action as “policymaking” in order to be left alone by
reviewing courts.
(3) Be willing to reconsider old precedents that, in effect,
decided policy issues as if they were questions of law decided at

266. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 364–66 (citations omitted).
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Chevron Step One. Allow the Board to revisit those questions,
subject to hard look review. Make it clear to the Board that this
reconsideration process is dependent on the quality of the Board’s
267
reasoning.
(4) For those precedents and new issues that are appropriately
viewed as law rather than policy, use the fuzziness of Mead to carve
out a category of adjudications that will not be entitled to Chevron
deference. (Mead made clear that “express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication” are a “very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment,” but stopped short of saying that all agency
268
adjudications must receive full Chevron deference.) Make it clear to
the Board, for example, that poorly reasoned decisions that exhibit no
meaningful expertise will be taken to be quick-and-dirty resolutions
of individual cases that lack the seriousness indicative of the intent to
make law.
(5) If these efforts prove unavailing, revise Mead to treat the use
of adjudication by an agency that also has the power to engage in
rulemaking as a negative factor in determining whether the agency’s
decision is entitled to full Chevron deference. Such a reworking of
Mead would no more require rulemaking than did Overton Park. It
would merely factor in to the NLRB’s calculus of the relative
advantages of rulemaking and adjudication as methods of “finding
law.”

267. We are aware that it is not only in the case of the NLRB that reviewing courts are
unclear about the level of deference they are actually applying (notwithstanding the
terminology they use and the precedents they cite). See Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals:
Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 657, 709 (2004) (“The Supreme Court’s deference doctrine may instead be
determined by other factors, it may reflect normative or doctrinal commitments independent of
short-term policy results, or it may be as confused and inconsistent as some observers have
charged.”). But the age of so many significant NLRB precedents compounds the problem in the
labor law setting. See Estlund, supra note 11, at 1527 (“[T]he National Labor Relations
Board . . . is increasingly hemmed in by the age of the text and the cumulative impact of stare
decisis.”).
268. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).

